

12-4547-cv  
*Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*

1 In the  
2 **United States Court of Appeals**  
3 **For the Second Circuit**

---

4  
5  
6 August Term, 2013

7  
8 No. 12-4547-cv  
9

10 AUTHORS GUILD, INC., AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY OF AUTHORS LIMITED,  
11 UNION DES ECRIVAINES ET DES ECRIVAINS QUEBECOIS, ANGELO  
12 LOUKAKIS, ROXANA ROBINSON, ANDRE ROY, JAMES SHAPIRO, DANIELE  
13 SIMPSON, T.J. STILES, FAY WELDON, AUTHORS LEAGUE FUND, INC.,  
14 AUTHORS' LICENSING AND COLLECTING SOCIETY, SVERIGES  
15 FORFATTARFORBUND, NORSK FAGLITTERAER FORFATTER-OG  
16 OVERSETTERFORENING, WRITERS' UNION OF CANADA, PAT CUMMINGS,  
17 ERIK GRUNDSTROM, HELGE RONNING, JACK R. SALAMANCA,  
18 *Plaintiffs-Appellants,*  
19

20 *v.*  
21

22 HATHITRUST, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, MARY SUE COLEMAN, President,  
23 University of Michigan, JANET NAPOLITANO, President, University of  
24 California, RAYMOND W. CROSS, President, University of Wisconsin  
25 System, MICHAEL MCROBBIE, President, Indiana University,  
26 *Defendants-Appellees,*<sup>1</sup>  
27

---

<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), we automatically substitute the current president of the University of California, Janet Napolitano, and the current president of the University of Wisconsin System, Raymond W. Cross, in place of their predecessors-in-office.

1 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, GEORGINA KLEEGER,  
2 BLAIR SEIDLITZ, COURTNEY WHEELER, ELLEN HOLLOMAN,  
3 *Intervenor Defendants-Appellees.*<sup>2</sup>

4 \_\_\_\_\_  
5  
6 Appeal from the United States District Court  
7 for the Southern District of New York.  
8 No. 11 CV 6351(HB) — Harold Baer, Jr., *Judge*.

9 \_\_\_\_\_  
10  
11 Argued: October 30, 2013  
12 Decided: June 10, 2014

13 \_\_\_\_\_  
14  
15 Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and PARKER, *Circuit Judges*.

16 \_\_\_\_\_  
17  
18 Plaintiff-appellant authors and authors' associations appeal a  
19 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern  
20 District of New York (Harold Baer, Jr., *Judge*) granting summary  
21 judgment to defendants-appellees and dismissing claims of  
22 copyright infringement. In addition, the court dismissed the claims  
23 of certain plaintiffs-appellants for lack of standing and dismissed  
24 other copyright claims as unripe. We hold, as a threshold matter,  
25 that certain plaintiffs-appellants lack associational standing. We also  
26 hold that the doctrine of "fair use" allows defendants-appellees to  
27 create a full-text searchable database of copyrighted works and to  
28 provide those works in formats accessible to those with disabilities,  
29 and that the claims predicated upon the Orphan Works Project are  
30 not ripe for adjudication. We vacate so much of the judgment as is

\_\_\_\_\_

<sup>2</sup> The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

1 based on the district court's holding related to the claim of  
2 infringement predicated upon defendants-appellees' preservation of  
3 copyrighted works, and we remand for further proceedings on that  
4 issue. Affirmed, in part; vacated, in part.

5

---

6 EDWARD H. ROSENTHAL (Jeremy S. Goldman,  
7 Anna Kadyshevich, *on the brief*), Frankfurt Kurnit  
8 Klein & Selz, P.C., New York, NY, *for Plaintiffs-*  
9 *Appellants*.

10 JOSEPH PETERSEN (Robert Potter, Joseph Beck,  
11 Andrew Pequignot, Allison Scott Roach, *on the*  
12 *brief*), Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, New  
13 York, NY, *for Defendants-Appellees*.

14 DANIEL F. GOLDSTEIN (Jessica P. Weber, *on the*  
15 *brief*), Brown Goldstein & Levy, LLP, Baltimore,  
16 MD; Robert J. Bernstein, New York, NY, *on the*  
17 *brief*; Peter Jaszi, Chevy Chase, MD, *on the brief, for*  
18 *Intervenor Defendants-Appellees*.

19 Jennifer M. Urban, Pamela Samuelson, David  
20 Hansen, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public  
21 Policy Clinic, University of California, Berkeley,  
22 School of Law, Berkeley, CA, *for Amici Curiae 133*  
23 *Academic Authors*.

24 Blake E. Reid, Brian Wolfman, Institute for Public  
25 Representation, Georgetown University Law  
26 Center, Washington, DC, *for Amicus Curiae*  
27 *American Association of People with Disabilities*.

1 Jonathan Band, Jonathan Band PLLC,  
2 Washington, DC, *for Amicus Curiae American*  
3 *Library Association.*

4 David Leichtman, Hillel I. Parness, Shane D. St.  
5 Hill, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., New  
6 York, NY, *for Amicus Curiae American Society of*  
7 *Journalists and Authors, Inc.*

8 Brian G. Joseph, Karyn K. Ablin, Wiley Rein LLP;  
9 Ada Meloy, General Counsel, American Council  
10 on Education, Washington, DC, *for Amici Curiae*  
11 *American Council on Education, Association of*  
12 *American Universities, et al.*

13 Elizabeth A. McNamara, Alison B. Schary, Colin  
14 J. Peng-Sue, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New  
15 York, NY, *for Amicus Curiae the Associated Press.*

16 Mary E. Rasenberger, Nancy E. Wolff, Eleanor M.  
17 Lackman, Nicholas J. Tardif, Cowan DeBaets,  
18 Abrahams & Sheppard LLP, New York, NY, *for*  
19 *Amicus Curiae Association of American Publishers.*

20 Jo Anne Simon, Mary J. Goodwin, Amy F.  
21 Robertson, Jo Anne Simon, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, *for*  
22 *Amici Curiae Association on Higher Education and*  
23 *Disability, Marilyn J. Bartlett, et al.*

24 Brandon Butler, Washington, DC, *for Amici Curiae*  
25 *Beneficent Technology, Inc., and Learning Ally, Inc.*

26 Susan M. Kornfield, Bodman PLC, Ann Arbor,  
27 MI, *for Amici Curiae Board of Trustees of the*

1 *University of Illinois, Board of Trustees of Michigan*  
2 *State University, et al.*

3 Jason Schultz, Berkeley, CA; Matthew Sag,  
4 Chicago, IL, *for Amici Curiae Digital Humanities*  
5 *and Law Scholars.*

6 Michael Waterstone, Los Angeles, CA; Robert  
7 Dinerstein, Washington, DC; Christopher H.  
8 Knauf, Knauf Associates, Santa Monica, CA;  
9 Michael Stein, Cambridge, MA, *for Amici Curiae*  
10 *Disability Law Professors.*

11 Roderick M. Thompson, Stephanie P. Skaff,  
12 Deepak Gupta, Rochelle L. Woods, Farella Braun  
13 + Martel LLP, San Francisco, CA; Corynne  
14 McSherry, Daniel Nazer, Electronic Frontier  
15 Foundation, San Francisco, CA; John Bergmayer,  
16 Public Knowledge, Washington, DC; David Sohn,  
17 Center for Democracy & Technology,  
18 Washington, DC, *for Amicus Curiae Electronic*  
19 *Frontier Foundation.*

20 Stephen M. Schaetzel, Meunier Carlin &  
21 Curfman, LLC, Atlanta, GA, *for Amicus Curiae*  
22 *Emory Vaccine Center.*

23 Frederick A. Brodie, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw  
24 Pittman LLP, New York, NY, *for Amicus Curiae the*  
25 *Leland Stanford Junior University.*

26 Eric J. Grannis, The Law Offices of Eric J. Grannis,  
27 New York, NY, *for Amici Curiae Medical Historians.*

1 Steven B. Fabrizio, Kenneth L. Doroshov, Steven  
2 R. Englund, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington,  
3 DC, *for Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Association of*  
4 *America, Inc.*

5  
6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, *Circuit Judge:*

7 Beginning in 2004, several research universities including the  
8 University of Michigan, the University of California at Berkeley,  
9 Cornell University, and the University of Indiana agreed to allow  
10 Google to electronically scan the books in their collections. In  
11 October 2008, thirteen universities announced plans to create a  
12 repository for the digital copies and founded an organization called  
13 HathiTrust to set up and operate the HathiTrust Digital Library (or  
14 "HDL"). Colleges, universities, and other nonprofit institutions  
15 became members of HathiTrust and made the books in their  
16 collections available for inclusion in the HDL. HathiTrust currently  
17 has 80 member institutions and the HDL contains digital copies of  
18 more than ten million works, published over many centuries,  
19 written in a multitude of languages, covering almost every subject  
20 imaginable. This appeal requires us to decide whether the HDL's  
21 use of copyrighted material is protected against a claim of copyright  
22 infringement under the doctrine of fair use. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 107.

23 **BACKGROUND**

24 **A. The HathiTrust Digital Library**

25 HathiTrust permits three uses of the copyrighted works in the  
26 HDL repository. First, HathiTrust allows the general public to search  
27 for particular terms across all digital copies in the repository. Unless  
28 the copyright holder authorizes broader use, the search results show  
29 only the page numbers on which the search term is found within the

1 work and the number of times the term appears on each page. The  
 2 HDL does not display to the user any text from the underlying  
 3 copyrighted work (either in “snippet” form or otherwise).  
 4 Consequently, the user is not able to view either the page on which  
 5 the term appears or any other portion of the book.

6 Below is an example of the results a user might see after  
 7 running an HDL full-text search:

The screenshot shows the HathiTrust Digital Library search results for the query "anaphylactic shock". The page header includes the HathiTrust logo and navigation links. The search bar shows the query "anaphylactic shock". The main content area displays the following information:

- About this Book:** Allergy and tissue metabolism [by] W. G. Smith, ... Smith, Walter George. Copyright: Protected by copyright law.
- Get this Book:** Find in a library.
- Add to Collection:** Login to make your personal collections permanent.
- Share:** Permanent link to this book: <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015006705670>
- Version:** 2012-05-07 09:10 UTC

The search results section indicates that "anaphylactic AND shock" matched 41 pages in this item. A message states: "Full view is not available for this item due to copyright © restrictions." Below this, a list of page ranges with matching terms is shown:

- p.17 - 12 matching terms
- p.26 - 13 matching terms
- p.30 - 11 matching terms
- p.27 - 12 matching terms
- p.15 - 11 matching terms
- p.88 - 9 matching terms
- p.9 - 8 matching terms
- p.28 - 8 matching terms
- p.18 - 8 matching terms
- p.21 - 8 matching terms

Navigation links for the search results include "1 | 11 | 31 | 32 | next".

8

9 J.A. 681 ¶ 80 (Wilkin Decl.).

10 Second, the HDL allows member libraries to provide patrons  
 11 with certified print disabilities access to the full text of copyrighted  
 12 works. A “print disability” is any disability that prevents a person  
 13 from effectively reading printed material. Blindness is one example,

1 but print disabilities also include those that prevent a person from  
2 physically holding a book or turning pages. To use this service, a  
3 patron must obtain certification of his disability from a qualified  
4 expert. Through the HDL, a print-disabled user can obtain access to  
5 the contents of works in the digital library using adaptive  
6 technologies such as software that converts the text into spoken  
7 words, or that magnifies the text. Currently, the University of  
8 Michigan's library is the only HDL member that permits such  
9 access, although other member libraries intend to provide it in the  
10 future.

11 Third, by preserving the copyrighted books in digital form,  
12 the HDL permits members to create a replacement copy of the work,  
13 if the member already owned an original copy, the member's  
14 original copy is lost, destroyed, or stolen, and a replacement copy is  
15 unobtainable at a "fair" price elsewhere.

16 The HDL stores digital copies of the works in four different  
17 locations. One copy is stored on its primary server in Michigan, one  
18 on its secondary server in Indiana, and two on separate backup  
19 tapes at the University of Michigan.<sup>3</sup> Each copy contains the full text  
20 of the work, in a machine readable format, as well as the *images* of  
21 each page in the work as they appear in the print version.

## 22 B. The Orphan Works Project

23 Separate and apart from the HDL, in May 2011, the University  
24 of Michigan developed a project known as the Orphan Works  
25 Project (or "OWP"). An "orphan work" is an out-of-print work that

---

<sup>3</sup> Separate from the HDL, one copy is also kept by Google. Google's use of its copy is the subject of a separate lawsuit currently pending in this Court. See *Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013), *on remand*, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), *appeal docketed*, No. 13-4829 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2013).



1 is still in copyright, but whose copyright holder cannot be readily  
2 identified or located. *See* U.S. Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry,  
3 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 77 Fed. Reg. 64555 (Oct. 22,  
4 2012).

5 The University of Michigan conceived of the OWP in two  
6 stages: First, the project would attempt to identify out-of-print  
7 works, try to find their copyright holders, and, if no copyright  
8 holder could be found, publish a list of orphan works candidates to  
9 enable the copyright holders to come forward or be otherwise  
10 located. If no copyright holder came forward, the work was to be  
11 designated as an orphan work. Second, those works identified as  
12 orphan works would be made accessible in digital format to the  
13 OWP's library patrons (with simultaneous viewers limited to the  
14 number of hard copies owned by the library).

15 The University evidently became concerned that its screening  
16 process was not adequately distinguishing between orphan works  
17 (which were to be included in the OWP) and in-print works (which  
18 were not). As a result, before the OWP was brought online, but after  
19 the complaint was filed in this case, the University indefinitely  
20 suspended the project. No copyrighted work has been distributed or  
21 displayed through the project and it remains suspended as of this  
22 writing.

### 23 C. Proceedings in the District Court

24 This case began when twenty authors and authors'  
25 associations (collectively, the "Authors") sued HathiTrust, one of its  
26 member universities, and the presidents of four other member  
27 universities (collectively, the "Libraries") for copyright infringement  
28 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The National Federation of  
29 the Blind and three print-disabled students (the "Intervenors") were

1 permitted to intervene to defend their ability to continue using the  
2 HDL.

3 The Libraries initially moved for partial judgment on the  
4 pleadings on the ground that the authors' associations lacked  
5 standing to assert claims on behalf of their members and that the  
6 claims related to the OWP were not ripe. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  
7 The Libraries then moved for summary judgment on the remaining  
8 claims on the ground that their uses of copyrighted material were  
9 protected by the doctrine of fair use, *see* 17 U.S.C. § 107, and also by  
10 the Chafee Amendment, *see id.* § 121. The Intervenors moved for  
11 summary judgment on substantially the same grounds as the  
12 Libraries and, finally, the Authors cross-moved for summary  
13 judgment.

#### 14 **D. The District Court's Opinion**

15 The district court granted the Libraries' and Intervenors'  
16 motions for summary judgment on the infringement claims on the  
17 basis that the three uses permitted by the HDL were fair uses. In this  
18 assessment, the district court gave considerable weight to what it  
19 found to be the "transformative" nature of the three uses and to  
20 what it described as the HDL's "invaluable" contribution to the  
21 advancement of knowledge, *Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*, 902 F.  
22 Supp. 2d 445, 460-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The district court explained:

23 Although I recognize that the facts here may on some  
24 levels be without precedent, I am convinced that they  
25 fall safely within the protection of fair use such that  
26 there is no genuine issue of material fact. I cannot  
27 imagine a definition of fair use that would not  
28 encompass the transformative uses made by [the HDL]  
29 and would require that I terminate this invaluable  
30 contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of

1 the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals  
2 espoused by the [Americans With Disabilities Act of  
3 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as  
4 amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, *et seq.*)].

5 *Id.* at 464.

6 Next, the district court addressed the Libraries' Chafee  
7 Amendment defense. Under the Amendment, "authorized entities"  
8 are permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of a previously  
9 published, nondramatic literary work in specialized formats  
10 exclusively for use by the blind or other persons with disabilities. *See*  
11 17 U.S.C. § 121; *HathiTrust*, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465. Under § 121, an  
12 "'authorized entity' means a nonprofit organization or a  
13 governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide  
14 specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive  
15 reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with  
16 disabilities." 17 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1).

17 The district court stated that the ADA requires that libraries of  
18 educational institutions, such as the Libraries in this case, "have a  
19 primary mission to reproduce and distribute their collections to  
20 print-disabled individuals," which, according to Judge Baer, made  
21 "each library a potential 'authorized entity' under the Chafee  
22 Amendment." *HathiTrust*, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465. As a result, the  
23 district court concluded that "[t]he provision of access to previously  
24 published non-dramatic literary works within the HDL fits squarely  
25 within the Chafee Amendment, although Defendants may certainly  
26 rely on fair use . . . to justify copies made outside of these categories  
27 or in the event that they are not authorized entities." *Id.*

28 The district court held that certain associational plaintiffs  
29 lacked standing under the Copyright Act and dismissed them from  
30 the suit. *Id.* at 450-55. The district court also held that the OWP

1 claims were unripe for judicial review in the absence of crucial  
2 information about what the program would look like and whom it  
3 would affect should it be implemented, and because the Authors  
4 would suffer no hardship by deferring litigation until such time as  
5 the Libraries released the details of a new OWP and a revised list of  
6 orphan work candidates. *Id.* at 455-56. The court entered judgment  
7 against the Authors, and this appeal followed.

## 8 DISCUSSION

9 We review *de novo* under well-established standards the  
10 district court's decisions granting summary judgment and judgment  
11 on the pleadings. See *Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep't*, 709  
12 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment); *LaFaro v. N.Y.*  
13 *Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC*, 570 F. 3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (judgment  
14 on the pleadings).

15 As a threshold matter, we consider whether the authors'  
16 associations have standing to assert infringement claims on behalf of  
17 their members.

18 Three of these authors' associations—Authors Guild, Inc.,  
19 Australian Society of Authors Limited, and Writers' Union of  
20 Canada—claim to have standing, solely as a matter of U.S. law, to  
21 seek an injunction for copyright infringement on their members'  
22 behalf. But, as we have previously explained, § 501 of “the  
23 Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third  
24 parties to bring suits on their behalf.” *ABKCO Music, Inc. v.*  
25 *Harrisongs Music, Ltd.*, 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991); see also *Itar-*  
26 *Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc.*, 153 F.3d 82, 92 (2d  
27 Cir. 1998) (“United States law permits suit only by owners of ‘an  
28 exclusive right under a copyright’ . . . .” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b))).  
29 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that these associations

1 lack standing to bring suit on behalf of their members, and they  
2 were properly dismissed from the suit.

3 The remaining four authors' associations—Union des  
4 Écrivaines et des Écrivains Québécois, Authors' Licensing and  
5 Collecting Society, Sveriges Författarförbund, and Norsk faglitterær  
6 forfattero og oversetterforening—assert that foreign law confers  
7 upon them certain exclusive rights to enforce the copyrights of their  
8 foreign members (an assertion that the Libraries do not contest on  
9 this appeal). These four associations do have standing to bring suit  
10 on behalf of their members. *See Itar-Tass*, 153 F.3d at 93-94  
11 (recognizing that an association authorized by foreign law to  
12 administer its foreign members' copyrights has standing to seek  
13 injunctive relief on behalf of those members in U.S. court).

#### 14 I. Fair Use<sup>4</sup>

##### 15 A.

16 As the Supreme Court has explained, the overriding purpose  
17 of copyright is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts  
18 . . . .” *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994)  
19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); *see also Twentieth Century Music*  
20 *Corp. v. Aiken*, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). This goal has animated  
21 copyright law in Anglo-American history, beginning with the first  
22 copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1709, which declared itself  
23 to be “[a]n Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the

---

<sup>4</sup> Plaintiffs argue that the fair use defense is inapplicable to the activities at issue here, because the Copyright Act includes another section, 108, which governs “Reproduction [of copyrighted works] by Libraries . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 108. However, section 108 also includes a “savings clause,” which states, “Nothing in this section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .” § 108(f)(4). Thus, we do not construe § 108 as foreclosing our analysis of the Libraries’ activities under fair use, and we proceed with that analysis.

1 Copies of Printed Books in the Authors . . . during the Times therein  
2 mentioned.” Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, ch. 19.  
3 In short, our law recognizes that copyright is “not an inevitable,  
4 divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute  
5 ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate  
6 activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the  
7 public.” Pierre N. Leval, *Toward a Fair Use Standard*, 103 HARV. L.  
8 REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).

9 The Copyright Act furthers this core purpose by granting  
10 authors a limited monopoly over (and thus the opportunity to profit  
11 from) the dissemination of their original works of authorship. *See* 17  
12 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 302-305. The Copyright Act confers upon authors  
13 certain enumerated exclusive rights over their works during the  
14 term of the copyright, including the rights to reproduce the  
15 copyrighted work and to distribute those copies to the public. *Id.*  
16 § 106(1), (3). The Act also gives authors the exclusive right to prepare  
17 certain new works—called “derivative works”—that are based upon  
18 the copyrighted work. *Id.* § 106(2). Paradigmatic examples of  
19 derivative works include the translation of a novel into another  
20 language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or a play, or the  
21 recasting of a novel as an e-book or an audiobook. *See id.* § 101. As a  
22 general rule, for works created after January 1, 1978, copyright  
23 protection lasts for the life of the author plus an additional 70 years.  
24 *Id.* § 302.

25 At the same time, there are important limits to an author’s  
26 rights to control original and derivative works. One such limit is the  
27 doctrine of “fair use,” which allows the public to draw upon  
28 copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright  
29 holder in certain circumstances. *See id.* § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a  
30 copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). “From  
31 the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of

1 copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill  
2 copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and  
3 useful Arts . . . .'" *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 574.

4 Under the fair-use doctrine, a book reviewer may, for  
5 example, quote from an original work in order to illustrate a point  
6 and substantiate criticisms, see *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344  
7 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and a biographer may quote from  
8 unpublished journals and letters for similar purposes, see *Wright v.*  
9 *Warner Books, Inc.*, 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991). An artist may employ  
10 copyrighted photographs in a new work that uses a fundamentally  
11 different artistic approach, aesthetic, and character from the original.  
12 See *Cariou v. Prince*, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). An internet  
13 search engine can display low-resolution versions of copyrighted  
14 images in order to direct the user to the website where the original  
15 could be found. See *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146,  
16 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811, 818-22  
17 (9th Cir. 2002). A newspaper can publish a copyrighted photograph  
18 (taken for a modeling portfolio) in order to inform and entertain the  
19 newspaper's readership about a news story. See *Nunez v. Caribbean*  
20 *Int'l News Corp.*, 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). A viewer can create a  
21 recording of a broadcast television show in order to view it at a later  
22 time. See *Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417,  
23 447-450 (1984). And a competitor may create copies of copyrighted  
24 software for the purpose of analyzing that software and discovering  
25 how it functions (a process called "reverse engineering"). See *Sony*  
26 *Comp. Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596, 599-601  
27 (9th Cir. 2000).

28 The doctrine is generally subject to an important proviso: A  
29 fair use must not excessively damage the market for the original by  
30 providing the public with a substitute for that original work. Thus, a  
31 book review may fairly quote a copyrighted book "for the purposes



1 of fair and reasonable criticism,” *Folsom*, 9 F. Cas. at 344, but the  
2 review may not quote extensively from the “heart” of a forthcoming  
3 memoir in a manner that usurps the right of first publication and  
4 serves as a substitute for purchasing the memoir, *Harper & Row,*  
5 *Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

6 In 1976, as part of a wholesale revision of the Copyright Act,  
7 Congress codified the judicially created fair-use doctrine at 17 U.S.C.  
8 § 107. *See* Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat.  
9 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107). Section  
10 107 requires a court to consider four nonexclusive factors which are  
11 to be weighed together to assess whether a particular use is fair:

12 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including  
13 whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for  
14 nonprofit educational purposes;

15 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

16 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in  
17 relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

18 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or  
19 value of the copyrighted work.

20 17 U.S.C. § 107.

21 An important focus of the first factor is whether the use is  
22 “transformative.” A use is transformative if it does something more  
23 than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work. The  
24 inquiry is whether the work “adds something new, with a further  
25 purpose or different character, altering the first with new  
26 expression, meaning or message . . . .” *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579  
27 (citing *Leval*, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111). “[T]he more transformative  
28 the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . .



1 that may weigh against a finding of fair use." *Id.* Contrary to what  
2 the district court implied, a use does not become transformative by  
3 making an "invaluable contribution to the progress of science and  
4 cultivation of the arts." *HathiTrust*, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 464. Added  
5 value or utility is not the test: a transformative work is one that  
6 serves a new and different function from the original work and is  
7 not a substitute for it.

8 The second factor considers whether the copyrighted work is  
9 "of the creative or instructive type that the copyright laws value and  
10 seek to foster." Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1117; *see also Folsom*, 9 F.  
11 Cas. at 348 ("[W]e must often . . . look to the nature and objects of  
12 the selections made . . ."). For example, the law of fair use  
13 "recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works  
14 of fiction or fantasy." *Harper & Row*, 471 U.S. at 563.

15 The third factor asks whether the secondary use employs  
16 more of the copyrighted work than is necessary, and whether the  
17 copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes asserted  
18 under the first factor. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586-87. In weighing this  
19 factor, we assess the quantity and value of the materials used and  
20 whether the amount copied is reasonable in relation to the  
21 purported justifications for the use under the first factor. Leval, 103  
22 HARV. L. REV. at 1123.

23 Finally, the fourth factor requires us to assess the impact of the  
24 use on the traditional market for the copyrighted work. This is the  
25 "single most important element of fair use." *Harper & Row*, 471 U.S.  
26 at 566. To defeat a claim of fair use, the copyright holder must point  
27 to market harm that results because the secondary use serves as a  
28 substitute for the original work. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 591  
29 ("cognizable market harm" is limited to "market substitution"); *see*  
30 *also NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst.*, 364 F.3d 471, 481-82 (2d Cir. 2004).

1

**B.**

2 As discussed above, the Libraries permit three uses of the  
3 digital copies deposited in the HDL. We now consider whether these  
4 uses are “fair” within the meaning of our copyright law.

5

**1. Full-Text Search**

6 It is not disputed that, in order to perform a full-text search of  
7 books, the Libraries must first create digital copies of the entire  
8 books. Importantly, as we have seen, the HDL does not allow users  
9 to view any portion of the books they are searching. Consequently,  
10 in providing this service, the HDL does not add into circulation any  
11 new, human-readable copies of any books. Instead, the HDL simply  
12 permits users to “word search”—that is, to locate where specific  
13 words or phrases appear in the digitized books. Applying the  
14 relevant factors, we conclude that this use is a fair use.

15

**i.**

16 Turning to the first factor, we conclude that the creation of a  
17 full-text searchable database is a quintessentially transformative use.  
18 As the example on page 7, *supra*, demonstrates, the result of a word  
19 search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and  
20 message from the page (and the book) from which it is drawn.  
21 Indeed, we can discern little or no resemblance between the original  
22 text and the results of the HDL full-text search.

23

24 There is no evidence that the Authors write with the purpose  
25 of enabling text searches of their books. Consequently, the full-text  
26 search function does not “supersede[] the objects [or purposes] of  
27 the original creation,” *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation  
28 marks omitted). The HDL does not “merely repackage[] or  
republish[] the original[s],” *Leval*, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111, or

1 merely recast “an original work into a new mode of presentation,”  
2 *Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc.*, 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d  
3 Cir. 1998). Instead, by enabling full-text search, the HDL adds to the  
4 original something new with a different purpose and a different  
5 character.

6 Full-text search adds a great deal more to the copyrighted  
7 works at issue than did the transformative uses we approved in  
8 several other cases. For example, in *Cariou v. Prince*, we found that  
9 certain photograph collages were transformative, even though the  
10 collages were cast in the same medium as the copyrighted  
11 photographs. 714 F.3d at 706. Similarly, in *Bill Graham Archives v.*  
12 *Dorling Kindersley Ltd.*, we held that it was a transformative use to  
13 include in a biography copyrighted concert photos, even though the  
14 photos were unaltered (except for being reduced in size). 448 F.3d  
15 605, 609-11 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Blanch v. Koons*, 467 F.3d 244, 252-  
16 53 (2d Cir. 2006) (transformative use of copyrighted photographs in  
17 collage painting); *Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.*, 137 F.3d 109,  
18 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (transformative use of copyrighted photograph in  
19 advertisement).

20 Cases from other Circuits reinforce this conclusion. In *Perfect*  
21 *10, Inc.*, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of copyrighted thumbnail  
22 images in internet search results was transformative because the  
23 thumbnail copies served a different function from the original  
24 copyrighted images. 508 F.3d at 1165; *accord Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336  
25 F.3d at 819. And in *A.V. ex rel. Vanderhuy v. iParadigms, LLC*, a  
26 company created electronic copies of unaltered student papers for  
27 use in connection with a computer program that detects plagiarism.  
28 Even though the electronic copies made no “substantive alteration  
29 to” the copyrighted student essays, the Fourth Circuit held that  
30 plagiarism detection constituted a transformative use of the  
31 copyrighted works. 562 F.3d 630, 639-40.

1

**ii.**

2 The second fair-use factor—the nature of the copyrighted  
3 work—is not dispositive. The HDL permits the full-text search of  
4 every type of work imaginable. Consequently, there is no dispute  
5 that the works at issue are of the type that the copyright laws value  
6 and seek to protect. However, “this factor ‘may be of limited  
7 usefulness where,’ as here, ‘the creative work . . . is being used for a  
8 transformative purpose.” *Cariou*, 714 F.3d at 710 (quoting *Bill  
9 Graham Archives*, 448 F.3d at 612). Accordingly, our fair-use analysis  
10 hinges on the other three factors.

11

**iii.**

12 The third factor asks whether the copying used more of the  
13 copyrighted work than necessary and whether the copying was  
14 excessive. As we have noted, “[t]here are no absolute rules as to how  
15 much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a  
16 fair use.” *Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell*, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir.  
17 1986). “[T]he extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose  
18 and character of the use.” *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586-87. The crux of  
19 the inquiry is whether “no more was taken than necessary.” *Id.* at  
20 589. For some purposes, it may be necessary to copy the entire  
21 copyrighted work, in which case Factor Three does not weigh  
22 against a finding of fair use. See *Bill Graham Archives*, 448 F.3d at 613  
23 (entire image copied); *Arriba Soft*, 336 F.3d at 821 (“If Arriba only  
24 copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to identify it,  
25 thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine.”).

26

27 In order to enable the full-text search function, the Libraries,  
as we have seen, created digital copies of all the books in their

1 collections.<sup>5</sup> Because it was reasonably necessary for the HDL to  
2 make use of the entirety of the works in order to enable the full-text  
3 search function, we do not believe the copying was excessive.

4 The Authors also contend that the copying is excessive  
5 because the HDL creates and maintains copies of the works at four  
6 different locations Appellants' Br. 27-28. But the record  
7 demonstrates that these copies are also reasonably necessary in  
8 order to facilitate the HDL's legitimate uses. In particular, the HDL's  
9 services are offered to patrons through two servers, one at the  
10 University of Michigan (the primary server) and an identical one at  
11 the University of Indiana (the "mirror" server). Both servers contain  
12 copies of the digital works at issue. According to the HDL executive  
13 director, the "existence of a[n] [identical] mirror site allows for  
14 balancing the load of user web traffic to avoid overburdening a  
15 single site, and each site acts as a back-up of the HDL collection in  
16 the event that one site were to cease operation (for example, due to  
17 failure caused by a disaster, or even as a result of routine  
18 maintenance)." J.A. 682-83 ¶ 88-89 (Wilkin Decl.). To further guard  
19 against the risk of data loss, the HDL stores copies of the works on  
20 two encrypted backup tapes, which are disconnected from the  
21 internet and are placed in separate secure locations on the  
22 University of Michigan campus. *Id.* at 683 ¶ 90. The HDL creates  
23 these backup tapes so that the data could be restored in "the event of  
24 a disaster causing large-scale data loss" to the primary and mirror  
25 servers. *Id.*

---

<sup>5</sup> The HDL also creates digital copies of the images of each page of the books. As the Libraries acknowledge, the HDL does not need to retain these copies to enable the full-text search use. We discuss the fair-use justification for these copies in the context of the disability-access use, *see infra* pp. 29-30.

1 We have no reason to think that these copies are excessive or  
2 unreasonable in relation to the purposes identified by the Libraries  
3 and permitted by the law of copyright. In sum, even viewing the  
4 evidence in the light most favorable to the Authors, the record  
5 demonstrates that these copies are reasonably necessary to facilitate  
6 the services HDL provides to the public and to mitigate the risk of  
7 disaster or data loss. Accordingly, we conclude that this factor  
8 favors the Libraries.

9 **iv.**

10 The fourth factor requires us to consider “the effect of the use  
11 upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17  
12 U.S.C. § 107(4), and, in particular, whether the secondary use  
13 “usurps the market of the original work,” *NXIVM Corp.*, 364 F.3d at  
14 482.

15 The Libraries contend that the full-text-search use poses no  
16 harm to any existing or potential traditional market and point to the  
17 fact that, in discovery, the Authors admitted that they were unable  
18 to identify “any specific, quantifiable past harm, or any documents  
19 relating to any such past harm,” resulting from any of the Libraries’  
20 uses of their works (including full-text search). Defs.-Appellees’  
21 Br. 38 (citing Pls.’ Resps. to Interrogs.). The district court agreed with  
22 this contention, as do we.

23 At the outset, it is important to recall that the Factor Four  
24 analysis is concerned with only one type of economic injury to a  
25 copyright holder: the harm that results because the secondary use  
26 serves as a substitute for the original work. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at  
27 591 (“cognizable market harm” is limited to “market substitution”).  
28 In other words, under Factor Four, any economic “harm” caused by  
29 transformative uses does not count because such uses, by definition,

1 do not serve as substitutes for the original work. *See Bill Graham*  
2 *Archives*, 448 F.3d at 614.

3 To illustrate why this is so, consider how copyright law treats  
4 book reviews. Book reviews often contain quotations of copyrighted  
5 material to illustrate the reviewer's points and substantiate his  
6 criticisms; this is a paradigmatic fair use. And a negative book  
7 review can cause a degree of economic injury to the author by  
8 dissuading readers from purchasing copies of her book, even when  
9 the review does not serve as a substitute for the original. But,  
10 obviously, in that case, the author has no cause for complaint under  
11 Factor Four: The only market harms that count are the ones that are  
12 caused because the secondary use serves as a substitute for the  
13 original, not when the secondary use is transformative (as in  
14 quotations in a book review). *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 591-92  
15 ("[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills  
16 demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable  
17 under the Copyright Act.").

18 The Authors assert two reasons why the full-text-search  
19 function harms their traditional markets. The first is a "lost sale"  
20 theory which posits that a market for licensing books for digital  
21 search could possibly develop in the future, and the HDL impairs  
22 the emergence of such a market because it allows patrons to search  
23 books without any need for a license. Thus, according to the  
24 Authors, every copy employed by the HDL in generating full-text  
25 searches represents a lost opportunity to license the book for search.  
26 Appellants' Br. 43.

27 This theory of market harm does not work under Factor Four,  
28 because the full-text search function does not serve as a substitute  
29 for the books that are being searched. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 591-  
30 92; *Bill Graham Archives*, 448 F.3d at 614. Thus, it is irrelevant that the



1 Libraries might be willing to purchase licenses in order to engage in  
2 this transformative use (if the use were deemed unfair). Lost  
3 licensing revenue counts under Factor Four only when the use  
4 serves as a substitute for the original and the full-text-search use  
5 does not.

6 Next, the Authors assert that the HDL creates the risk of a  
7 security breach which might impose irreparable damage on the  
8 Authors and their works. In particular, the Authors speculate that, if  
9 hackers were able to obtain unauthorized access to the books stored  
10 at the HDL, the full text of these tens of millions of books might be  
11 distributed worldwide without restriction, “decimat[ing]” the  
12 traditional market for those works. Appellants’ Br. 40.

13 The record before us documents the extensive security  
14 measures the Libraries have undertaken to safeguard against the  
15 risk of a data breach. Some of those measures were described by the  
16 HDL executive director as follows:

17 First, [HDL] maintains . . . rigorous physical  
18 security controls. HDL servers, storage, and networking  
19 equipment at Michigan and Indiana University are  
20 mounted in locked racks, and only six individuals at  
21 Michigan and three at Indiana University have keys.  
22 The data centers housing HDL servers, storage, and  
23 networking equipment at each site location are  
24 monitored by video surveillance, and entry requires use  
25 of both a keycard and a biometric sensor.

26 Second, network access to the HDL corpus is  
27 highly restricted, even for the staff of the data centers  
28 housing HDL equipment at Michigan and Indiana  
29 University. For example, two levels of network firewalls  
30 are in place at each site, and Indiana University data



1 center staff do not have network access to the HDL  
2 corpus, only access to the physical equipment. For the  
3 backup tapes, network access is limited to the  
4 administrators of the backup system, and these  
5 individuals are not provided the encryption key that  
6 would be required to access the encrypted files on the  
7 backup tapes.

8 Web access to the HDL corpus is also highly  
9 restricted. Access by users of the HDL service is  
10 governed by primarily by [sic] the HDL rights database,  
11 which classifies each work by presumed copyright  
12 status, and also by a user's authentication to the system  
13 (e.g., as an individual certified to have a print disability  
14 by Michigan's Office of Services for Students with  
15 Disabilities).

16 . . .

17 Even where we do permit a work to be read  
18 online, such as a work in the public domain, we make  
19 efforts to ensure that inappropriate levels of access do  
20 not take place. For example, a mass download  
21 prevention system called "choke" is used to measure  
22 the rate of activity (such as the rate a user is reading  
23 pages) by each individual user. If a user's rate of  
24 activity exceeds certain thresholds, the system assumes  
25 that the user is mechanized (e.g., a web robot) and  
26 blocks that user's access for a set period of time.

27 J.A. 683-85 ¶¶ 94-96, 98 (Wilkins Decl.).

28 This showing of the security measures taken by the Libraries  
29 is essentially un rebutted. Consequently, we see no basis in the

1 record on which to conclude that a security breach is likely to occur,  
2 much less one that would result in the public release of the specific  
3 copyrighted works belonging to any of the plaintiffs in this case. *Cf.*  
4 *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, --- U.S. ---, ---, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143,  
5 1149 (2013) (risk of future harm must be “certainly impending,”  
6 rather than merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” to constitute a  
7 cognizable injury-in-fact); *Sony Corp.*, 464 U.S. at 453-54 (concluding  
8 that time-shifting using a Betamax is fair use because the copyright  
9 owners’ “prediction that live television or movie audiences will  
10 decrease” was merely “speculative”). Factor Four thus favors a  
11 finding of fair use.

12 Without foreclosing a future claim based on circumstances not  
13 now predictable, and based on a different record, we hold that the  
14 balance of relevant factors in this case favors the Libraries. In sum,  
15 we conclude that the doctrine of fair use allows the Libraries to  
16 digitize copyrighted works for the purpose of permitting full-text  
17 searches.

## 18 **2. Access to the Print-Disabled**

19 The HDL also provides print-disabled patrons with versions  
20 of all of the works contained in its digital archive in formats  
21 accessible to them. In order to obtain access to the works, a patron  
22 must submit documentation from a qualified expert verifying that  
23 the disability prevents him or her from reading printed materials,  
24 and the patron must be affiliated with an HDL member that has  
25 opted-into the program. Currently, the University of Michigan is the  
26 only HDL member institution that has opted-in. We conclude that  
27 this use is also protected by the doctrine of fair use.

1

## i.

2 In applying the Factor One analysis, the district court  
3 concluded that “[t]he use of digital copies to facilitate access for  
4 print-disabled persons is [a] transformative” use. *HathiTrust*, 902 F.  
5 Supp. 2d at 461. This is a misapprehension; providing expanded  
6 access to the print disabled is not “transformative.”

7 As discussed above, a transformative use adds something new  
8 to the copyrighted work and does not merely supersede the  
9 purposes of the original creation. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579. The  
10 Authors state that they “write books to be read (or listened to).”  
11 Appellants’ Br. 34-35. By making copyrighted works available in  
12 formats accessible to the disabled, the HDL enables a larger  
13 audience to read those works, but the underlying purpose of the  
14 HDL’s use is the same as the author’s original purpose.

15 Indeed, when the HDL recasts copyrighted works into new  
16 formats to be read by the disabled, it appears, at first glance, to be  
17 creating derivative works over which the author ordinarily  
18 maintains control. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). As previously noted,  
19 paradigmatic examples of derivative works include translations of  
20 the original into a different language, or adaptations of the original  
21 into different forms or media. *See id.* § 101 (defining “derivative  
22 work”). The Authors contend that by converting their works into a  
23 different, accessible format, the HDL is simply creating a derivative  
24 work.

25 It is true that, oftentimes, the print-disabled audience has no  
26 means of obtaining access to the copyrighted works included in the  
27 HDL. But, similarly, the non-English-speaking audience cannot gain  
28 access to untranslated books written in English and an unauthorized  
29 translation is not transformative simply because it enables a new  
30 audience to read a work.

1 This observation does not end the analysis. “While a  
2 transformative use generally is more likely to qualify as fair use,  
3 ‘transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair  
4 use.’” *Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P.*, --- F.3d ---, ---,  
5 2014 WL 2219162, at \*7 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at  
6 579). We conclude that providing access to the print-disabled is still  
7 a valid purpose under Factor One even though it is not  
8 transformative. We reach that conclusion for several reasons.

9 First, the Supreme Court has already said so. As Justice  
10 Stevens wrote for the Court: “Making a copy of a copyrighted work  
11 for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the  
12 House Committee Report as an example of fair use, with no  
13 suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to  
14 inform need motivate the copying.” *Sony Corp. of Am.*, 464 U.S. at  
15 455 n.40.

16 Our conclusion is reinforced by the legislative history on  
17 which he relied. The House Committee Report that accompanied  
18 codification of the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976  
19 expressly stated that making copies accessible “for the use of blind  
20 persons” posed a “special instance illustrating the application of the  
21 fair use doctrine . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73 (1976), *reprinted in*  
22 *1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.* 5659, 5686. The Committee noted that “special  
23 [blind-accessible formats] . . . are not usually made by the publishers  
24 for commercial distribution.” *Id.* In light of its understanding of the  
25 market (or lack thereof) for books accessible to the blind, the  
26 Committee explained that “the making of a single copy or  
27 phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind persons  
28 [*sic*] would properly be considered a fair use under section 107.” *Id.*  
29 We believe this guidance supports a finding of fair use in the unique  
30 circumstances presented by print-disabled readers.



1 more useful method by which many disabled patrons, especially  
2 students and scholars, can obtain access to these works. These image  
3 files contain information, such as pictures, charts, diagrams, and the  
4 layout of the text on the printed page that cannot be converted to  
5 text or speech. None of this is captured by the HDL's text-only  
6 copies. Many legally blind patrons are capable of viewing these  
7 images if they are sufficiently magnified or if the color contrasts are  
8 increased. And other disabled patrons, whose physical impairments  
9 prevent them from turning pages or from holding books, may also  
10 be able to use assistive devices to view all of the content contained in  
11 the image files for a book. For those individuals, gaining access to  
12 the HDL's image files—in addition to the text-only files—is  
13 necessary to perceive the books fully. Consequently, it is reasonable  
14 for the Libraries to retain both the text and image copies.<sup>6</sup>

15

**iv.**

16 The fourth factor also weighs in favor of a finding of fair use.  
17 It is undisputed that the present-day market for books accessible to  
18 the handicapped is so insignificant that “it is common practice in the  
19 publishing industry for authors to forgo royalties that are generated  
20 through the sale of books manufactured in specialized formats for  
21 the blind . . . .” Appellants’ Br. 34. “[T]he number of accessible books  
22 currently available to the blind for borrowing is a mere few hundred  
23 thousand titles, a minute percentage of the world’s books. In  
24 contrast, the HDL contains more than ten million accessible  
25 volumes.” J.A. 173 ¶ 10 (Maurer Decl.). When considering the 1976  
26 Act, Congress was well aware of this problem. The House

---

<sup>6</sup> The Authors also complain that the HDL creates and maintains four separate copies of the copyrighted works at issue. Appellants’ Br. 27-28. For reasons discussed in the full-text search section, this does not preclude a finding of fair use. *See supra* pp. 20-22.

1 Committee Report observed that publishers did not “usually  
2 ma[ke]” their books available in specialized formats for the blind.  
3 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5686. That  
4 observation remains true today.

5 Weighing the factors together, we conclude that the doctrine  
6 of fair use allows the Libraries to provide full digital access to  
7 copyrighted works to their print-disabled patrons.<sup>7</sup>

### 8 **3. Preservation**

9 By storing digital copies of the books, the HDL preserves  
10 them for generations to come, and ensures that they will still exist  
11 when their copyright terms lapse. Under certain circumstances, the  
12 HDL also proposes to make one additional use of the digitized  
13 works while they remain under copyright: The HDL will permit  
14 member libraries to create a replacement copy of a book, to be read  
15 and consumed by patrons, if (1) the member already owned an  
16 original copy, (2) the member’s original copy is lost, destroyed, or  
17 stolen, and (3) a replacement copy is unobtainable at a fair price. The  
18 Authors claim that this use infringes their copyrights.

19 Even though the parties assume that this issue is appropriate  
20 for our determination, we are not convinced that this is so. The  
21 record before the district court does not reflect whether the plaintiffs  
22 own copyrights in any works that would be effectively irreplaceable  
23 at a fair price by the Libraries and, thus, would be potentially subject  
24 to being copied by the Libraries in case of the loss or destruction of  
25 an original. The Authors are not entitled to make this argument on  
26 behalf of others, because § 501 of “the Copyright Act does not  
27 permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on

---

<sup>7</sup> In light of our holding, we need not consider whether the disability-access use is protected under the Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. § 121.



1 their behalf.” *ABKCO Music*, 944 F.2d at 980; *see also* our discussion  
2 of standing, *supra* pp. 12-13.

3 Because the record before us does not reflect the existence of a  
4 non-speculative risk that the HDL might create replacement copies  
5 of the *plaintiffs’* copyrighted work, we do not believe plaintiffs have  
6 standing to bring this claim, and this concern does not present a live  
7 controversy for adjudication. *See Clapper*, --- U.S. at ---, 133 S. Ct. at  
8 1147; *Jennifer Matthew Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &*  
9 *Human Servs.*, 607 F.3d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that we have  
10 an “independent obligation” to evaluate subject matter jurisdiction,  
11 including whether there is “a live controversy”). Accordingly, we  
12 vacate the district court’s judgment insofar as it adjudicated this  
13 issue without first considering whether plaintiffs have standing to  
14 challenge the preservation use of the HDL, and we remand for the  
15 district court to so determine.

## 16 II. Ripeness of Claims Relating to the Orphan Works Project

17 The district court also held that the infringement claims  
18 asserted in connection with the OWP were not ripe for adjudication  
19 because the project has been abandoned and the record contained no  
20 information about whether the program will be revived and, if so,  
21 what it would look like or whom it would affect. *HathiTrust*, 902 F.  
22 Supp. 2d at 455-56. We agree.

23 In considering whether a claim is ripe, we consider (1) “the  
24 fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to  
25 the parties of withholding court consideration.” *Murphy v. New*  
26 *Milford Zoning Comm’n*, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting  
27 *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).

28 The fitness analysis is concerned with whether the issues  
29 sought to be adjudicated are contingent on unknowable future



1 events. *N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau*, 528 F. 3d 122, 132 (2d  
2 Cir. 2008). The Authors assert that their OWP claim is fit for judicial  
3 decision because it “will not change based upon the particular  
4 procedures that [the University of Michigan] ultimately employs to  
5 identify orphan works.” Appellants’ Br. 13. According to the  
6 Authors, the legality of the OWP does not depend upon the specific  
7 means the Libraries ultimately employ to identify orphan candidates  
8 or the time the Libraries wait before making works available. Rather,  
9 the Authors believe that any iteration of the OWP that results in the  
10 publication of complete copyrighted works is an infringement of  
11 copyright.

12 We are not persuaded that these concerns create a ripe  
13 dispute. Even assuming, *arguendo*, that “[a]ny iteration of the OWP  
14 under which copyrighted works are made available for public view  
15 and download” would infringe *someone’s* copyright, *id.*, it does not  
16 follow that the OWP will inevitably infringe the copyrights held by  
17 the remaining plaintiffs in this case.<sup>8</sup> It is conceivable that, should  
18 the University of Michigan ever revive the OWP, the procedures it  
19 ultimately implements to identify orphan works would successfully  
20 identify and exclude works to which a plaintiff in this suit holds a  
21 copyright. Consequently, we cannot say that any of the plaintiffs  
22 face a “certainly impending” harm under our ripeness analysis,  
23 *Clapper*, --- U.S. at ---, 133 S. Ct. at 1147; *see also Grandeau*, 528 F.3d at  
24 130 n.8.

25 Nor do we perceive any hardship if decision is withheld. *See*  
26 *Grandeau*, 528 F.3d at 134. The Authors argue that they would suffer  
27 hardship because “there is nothing to stop the Libraries from

---

<sup>8</sup> We note that, in addition to our conclusion about ripeness, the same reasoning leads us to conclude that the remaining plaintiffs lack standing to bring this claim, *see our* discussion of standing, *supra* pp. 12-13.

1 reinstating the OWP and then, if owners of the listed works come  
2 forward, suspending it again." Appellants' Br. 16.

3 We disagree. As indicated above, it is far from clear that the  
4 University of Michigan or HathiTrust will reinstitute the OWP in a  
5 manner that would infringe the copyrights of any proper plaintiffs.  
6 If that occurs, the Authors may always return to court. Suffice it to  
7 say that "[t]he mere possibility of future injury, unless it is the cause  
8 of some present detriment, does not constitute hardship." *Grandeau*,  
9 528 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted). For these  
10 reasons, we conclude that the OWP claims are not ripe for  
11 adjudication.

12 **CONCLUSION**

13 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, in part,  
14 insofar as the district court concluded that certain plaintiffs-  
15 appellants lack associational standing; that the doctrine of "fair use"  
16 allows defendants-appellees to create a full-text searchable database  
17 of copyrighted works and to provide those works in formats  
18 accessible to those with disabilities; and that claims predicated upon  
19 the Orphan Works Project are not ripe for adjudication. We  
20 VACATE the judgment, in part, insofar as it rests on the district  
21 court's holding related to the claim of infringement predicated upon  
22 defendants-appellees' preservation of copyrighted works, and we  
23 REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A True Copy

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

  
