

United States District Court  
For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SAVAGE,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.

No. C 07-6076 SI

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'  
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE  
PLEADINGS**

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC  
RELATIONS, INC., COUNCIL ON  
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS ACTION  
NETWORK, INC., COUNCIL ON  
AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS OF  
SANTA CLARA, INC., and DOES 3-100,  
  
Defendants.

Defendants' Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings came on for oral argument on April 7, 2008. Having considered the arguments of the parties and papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants' motion on both causes of action.

**BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff Michael Weiner, using the name "Michael Savage," is the host and star of "The Savage Nation," a nationally-syndicated radio program that plaintiff alleges "reaches eight million listeners per week." Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") at ¶¶ 1, 2. Plaintiff filed the instant suit in response to the use by defendants the Council<sup>1</sup> on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., the Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., and the Council on American-Islamic Relations of Santa Clara, Inc. (collectively "CAIR"), of a four-minute audio clip taken from plaintiff's radio program. Plaintiff

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<sup>1</sup>This defendant was referred to as the "Counsel on American-Islamic Relations, Inc." in the caption of the complaints. The parties apparently agree that the correct defendant is the "Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc." and the Court adopts this language.

1 alleges that defendants, in posting the audio clip on their website, engaged in copyright infringement  
2 in an effort to raise money for terrorism and further a terrorist conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges that  
3 defendants are connected to terrorist organizations operating abroad and that defendants are responsible  
4 in some way for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

5 The 9/11 attacks were a staggering national tragedy. But it is important to note that this case is  
6 not about 9/11 or efforts by the United States to prevent future terrorist activities. It is, rather, a dispute  
7 about the ideas expressed in a four-minute audio clip and the protections of the First Amendment,  
8 protections upon which plaintiff relies for his livelihood and the airing of his radio program.

9 The audio clip at issue in this dispute was taken from the two-hour long Savage Nation program  
10 that aired on October 29, 2007, in which it is undisputed that plaintiff said the following, among other  
11 things, about Muslims and about CAIR:

- 12 (1) "I don't want to hear one more word about Islam. Take your religion and shove it up your  
13 behind."
- 14 (2) "They need deportation . . . You can take [CAIR] and throw them out of my country."
- 15 (3) "You can take your due process and shove it . . ."
- 16 (4) "[I]ts Muslims screaming for the blood of Christians or Jews or anyone they hate."
- 17 (5) "[Islam], a religion that teaches convert or kill, a religion that says oppress women, kill  
18 homosexuals . . ."
- 19 (6) "The Quran is a document of slavery and chattel."

20 Ahmed Decl. at ex. A. In response to plaintiff's remarks, defendants posted on their website,  
21 www.cair.com, a detailed criticism of plaintiff's anti-Muslim and anti-CAIR commentary, entitled  
22 "National Radio Host Goes On Anti-Muslim Tirade." The web page explained defendants' objections  
23 to plaintiff's remarks, *see id.*, and included an audio file containing the above-quoted excerpts from the  
24 show that, when played in its entirety, runs for four minutes and thirteen seconds, SAC at ¶¶ 24. Plaintiff  
alleges that defendants' unauthorized use of his remarks was taken out of context and that defendants'  
"misportrayals" destroyed the value of his material and led to a loss of advertising revenue. SAC at ¶¶  
at 34-35; *see also* Ahmed Decl. at exs. A & B.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December 3, 2007. He has amended it twice since then,  
once as of right on December 25, 2007, and a second time by stipulation of the parties on February 14,  
2008. The Second Amended Complaint alleges copyright infringement and civil RICO claims against  
defendants. In a lengthy and polemical complaint, plaintiff alleges that CAIR misappropriated in excess

1 of four minutes of plaintiff's show for fund-raising purposes and that the segment was used in a manner  
2 designed to cause harm to the value of the copyrighted material. He alleges that this misappropriation  
3 was part of a criminal and political agenda to silence those speaking out against various facets of Islam.  
4 Plaintiff alleges that defendants' furtherance of foreign terrorist interests is part of a larger conspiracy  
5 of criminal activity that gives rise to his civil RICO claims. Generally, he alleges that defendants work  
6 to raise funds for terrorist groups, aim to silence voices that oppose their views, and have board  
7 members who are tied to alleged terrorist organizations. He further alleges that defendants are the  
8 domestic branch of a foreign terror organization posing as a civil rights organization.

9 Further reference to relevant background facts and allegations is set forth below in the body of  
10 the discussion.

#### 11 **LEGAL STANDARD**

12 "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move  
13 for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the  
14 moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to  
15 be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." *Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard*  
16 *Feiner & Co., Inc.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). "For purposes of the motion, the allegations  
17 of the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have  
18 been denied are assumed to be false." *Id.*

19 Although Rule 12(c) neither specifically authorizes nor prohibits motions for judgment on the  
20 pleadings "directed to less than the entire complaint or answer . . . [i]t is the practice of many judges to  
21 permit 'partial' judgment on the pleadings (e.g. on the first claim for relief, or the third affirmative  
22 defense)." See William W. Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima & James M. Wagstaffe, *Federal Civil*  
23 *Procedure Before Trial*, ¶ 9:340 (2001). "[C]ourts have discretion to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with  
24 leave to amend." *Id.* ¶ 9:341.

When considering a motion on the pleadings, courts may consider exhibits submitted or  
referenced in the complaint and matters that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of  
Evidence 201. See, e.g., *Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D.

1 Cal. 2007). Indeed, “documents specifically referred to in a complaint, though not physically attached  
 2 to the pleading, may be considered where authenticity is unquestioned.” *Id.* (citing *Daly v. Viacom, Inc.*,  
 3 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121-22 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (considering television program referenced in, but not  
 4 attached to, complaint).

## 5 DISCUSSION

### 6 I. Copyright Act claim

7 Plaintiff alleges copyright infringement by defendants because they “misappropriated copyright  
 8 protected material from [plaintiff] and made this material available on [their] website.” SAC at ¶ 27.  
 9 A prima facie case of copyright infringement exists because there is no dispute as to plaintiff’s  
 10 ownership of the copyrighted material and defendants’ copying of this material. *Hustler Magazine, Inc.*  
 11 *v. Moral Majority Inc.*, 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1986). However, defendants argue that plaintiff’s  
 12 claim is barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of fair use, which “permits [and requires] courts to  
 13 avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity  
 14 which that law is designed to foster.” *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)  
 15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides  
 16 that:

17 [T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism [and] comment  
 18 . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work  
 19 in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include –

- 20 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial  
 21 nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
- 22 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
- 23 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work  
 24 as a whole; and
- (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 107.

Two cases are particularly relevant to evaluating fair use in the instant case. The *Hustler* case  
 involved a fundraising appeal sent by Moral Majority to thousands of donors. The mailer included a

1 complete copy of a parody published in *Hustler Magazine*, used by Moral Majority without *Hustler's*  
2 permission. *See Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1150. Although the use was tied to an incontroverted  
3 fundraising and political purpose, the Ninth Circuit held that *Hustler's* copyright infringement claim was  
4 barred by the doctrine of fair use. *Id.* at 1152-53, 1156. It found that Moral Majority had not sold the  
5 copyrighted work as its own, but had used it for political comment about the plaintiff and to rebut the  
6 plaintiff's personal attack. *Id.* at 1153. The court reasoned that individual and institutional defendants  
7 may copy such portions of the work as is necessary to allow comprehensible comment in rebutting  
8 derogatory information. *Id.* (citing § 107 legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1474, at 73 (1976),  
9 reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5687). The Ninth Circuit concluded that Moral Majority's  
10 copying of the entire parody was reasonably necessary to provide such comment, and held that the  
11 public interest in allowing individuals and institutions a defense against derogatory attacks rebuts the  
12 presumption of unfairness that otherwise might attach when a use is connected to a commercial purpose.  
13 *Id.*

14 The second case of particular relevance here is *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, in which  
15 the Supreme Court considered whether fair use should apply to a situation in which a rap group created  
16 a "shocking" parody of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman." *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 572-73. The Supreme  
17 Court held that the defendant's commercial parody, which copied portions of the plaintiff's copyrighted  
18 song, constituted fair use. In reaching the decision, it considered whether the new work was  
19 "transformative," embodying a different purpose, meaning, or message from the original work. *Id.* at  
20 579. The court recognized transformative works as being "at the heart of the fair use doctrine," such  
21 that the commercial purpose of the use was given less weight. *Id.* The defendant's parody was clearly  
22 intended to ridicule the original, and the court found it irrelevant to evaluate whether the parody was  
23 in bad taste. *Id.* at 582. The court further reasoned that the commercial character of a use does not bar  
24 a finding of fairness because many permissible uses, such as comment, criticism, news reporting, and  
teaching, are done for profit. *Id.* at 584.

25 The doctrine of fair use is evaluated as a "mixed question of law and fact." *Harper & Row*  
*Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). However, "[i]f there are no genuine issues  
of material fact, or if, even after resolving all issues in favor of the opposing party, a reasonable trier

1 of fact can reach only one conclusion, a court may conclude as a matter of law whether the challenged  
2 use qualifies as fair use of the copyrighted work.” *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1151; *see, e.g., Fisher*  
3 *v. Dees*, 794 F.2d 432, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding fair use where the operative facts were  
4 undisputed or assumed; the court is to make fair use judgments, which “are legal in nature”);  
5 *Leadsinger, Inc., v. BMG Music Pub.*, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008).

6 All fair use factors must be explored and weighed together, not in isolation, while considering  
7 the purposes of the Copyright Act. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 578. Moreover, the scope of fair use is broader  
8 when the information relayed involves issues of concern to the public. *Harper & Row Publishers*, 471  
9 U.S. at 555-56. The Court evaluates the parties’ arguments on each of these four fair use factors and  
10 weighs the factors below.

11 **A. The purpose and character of the use**

12 Defendants argue that the first factor favors the application of the fair use doctrine because there  
13 is no dispute that the purpose and character of their use of the copyrighted materials was a form of  
14 public criticism and commentary protected by the Copyright Act. Plaintiff argues that the fair use  
15 defense is inapplicable to defendants’ usage of, and comment on, segments of the copyrighted audio  
16 work because defendants’ “infringement was not done for genuine criticism or comment,” but instead  
17 misrepresented plaintiff’s views with the intention to raise funds for their own political purposes as “a  
18 foreign agent for international terror” under the guise of a non-profit, civil rights group. Plaintiff’s  
19 Opposition at 5-7; *see* SAC at ¶¶ 24, 28-30, 32. Plaintiff asserts that these alleged motives behind the  
20 usage and comment are fatal to defendants’ fair use defense because fair use presupposes good faith and  
21 fair dealing.

22 The first fair use factor examines the “purpose and character of the use,” considering whether  
23 the character of the use is criticism and commentary and weighing, for instance, the “commercial or  
24 nonprofit purpose of the use.” *See* 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). The use of copyrighted work for a commercial  
purpose is presumptively unfair. *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1152. However, “[s]ection 107  
expressly permits fair use for the purposes of criticism and commentary.” *Id.* at 1153. In addition, the  
Supreme Court has recognized that commentary and criticism “traditionally have had a claim to fair use

1 protection.” *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 583. Therefore, “[e]ven assuming that the use had a purely  
2 commercial purpose, the presumption of unfairness can be rebutted by the characteristics of the use.”  
3 *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1152-53.

4 Plaintiff tries to conflate “motive” with the purpose and character of the use, which is not  
5 permitted by the case law. Rather, even assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations about motive, it is  
6 the manner of use, not the motivation behind it, which must be analyzed: “what use was made,” rather  
7 than “who is the user.” Defendants’ Reply at 3.

8 Plaintiff places primary reliance on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in *Harper and Row*, but it  
9 does not go so far as plaintiff contends. The *Harper and Row* court recognized that fair use presupposes  
10 good faith and fair dealing in the manner in which the copyrighted work was obtained by the defendant.  
11 *Harper & Row Publishers*, 471 U.S. at 562-63. Accordingly, in evaluating the “character of the use”  
12 aspect of the first factor, the court found relevant “the propriety of the defendant’s conduct.” *Id.* The  
13 court found that by “exploiting a purloined manuscript” before the plaintiff had a chance to publish it,  
14 the defendants had arrogated to themselves the valuable commercial right of first publication, which  
15 weighed against a finding of fair use. *Id.* The Supreme Court’s good faith inquiry concerned how the  
16 original work was obtained, not the motive behind the use. *See id.* Here, plaintiff does not claim that  
17 the audio segments were not obtained in good faith, but alleges only that defendants’ motives are  
18 improper. In fact, plaintiff was the first to publicly broadcast the excerpts used by defendants, making  
19 the work readily accessible to anyone. Unlike *Harper*, there can be no claim of theft in obtaining the  
20 excerpts or destroying plaintiff’s right of first publication here. Defendants obtained the audio segments  
21 just as the general public would, and plaintiff’s arguments as to defendants’ alleged motives are not  
22 relevant to evaluating this factor.

23 Moreover, *Hustler* held as fair use the defendants’ distributing of plaintiff’s entire parody, despite  
24 the political purposes served by the defendants’ use. *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1153. Protection  
under the doctrine of fair use extends to those with a political purpose, even those engaged in  
fundraising activities. Thus plaintiff’s allegation that defendants placed the link to the plaintiff’s audio  
excerpt near a donate button on defendants’ web page does not vitiate fair use, where defendants’ use

1 of the audio excerpt called attention to plaintiff's statements to raise funds from defendants' supporters,  
2 by providing criticism and comment. *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1152-3, 1156; *Campbell*, 510 U.S.  
3 at 571-72, 584; *see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp.*, \_\_\_ F. Supp. 2d \_\_\_, 2008 WL 2262631, at  
4 \*8 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2008) (balance of factors clearly favors finding of fair use where defendants used  
5 an excerpt from the John Lennon song "Imagine" in order to critique the lyrics contained in that  
6 excerpt).

7 Plaintiff has made no allegation that defendants used plaintiff's work for anything other than  
8 criticism of or comment on plaintiff's views; rather, the complaint affirmatively asserts that the purpose  
9 and character of defendants' use of the limited excerpts from the radio show was to criticize publicly  
10 the anti-Muslim message of those excerpts. *See* SAC at ¶¶ 26, 28, 32, 42. To comment on plaintiff's  
11 statements without reference or citation to them would not only render defendants' criticism less  
12 reliable, but be unfair to plaintiff. Further, it was not unreasonable for defendants to provide the actual  
13 audio excerpts, since they reaffirmed the authenticity of the criticized statements and provided the  
14 audience with the tone and manner in which plaintiff made the statements.

15 For all of these reasons, the Court finds that defendants used plaintiff's material in order to  
16 criticize and comment on plaintiff's statements and views. These facts are uncontested, and the Court  
17 finds that this factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants.

18 **B. The nature of the copyrighted work**

19 The work at issue is part of a radio talk show about public affairs. Defendants argue that, as a  
20 result, the law affords it less copyright protection, because the content of the work is more informational  
21 than creative. Plaintiff opposes by pointing to his allegations that his show is a performance with "value  
22 beyond the words and ideas conveyed," Plaintiff's Opposition at 7-8, which he compares to "live theater  
23 . . . or other genres where a performer combines social commentary with powerful performance," SAC  
24 at ¶¶ 3-4.

25 The second fair use factor considers the nature of the copyrighted work at issue. 17 U.S.C. §  
107(2). In evaluating this factor, courts have considered creative works to be "closer to the core of



1 intended copyright protection” than “informational” works. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586; *Hustler*  
2 *Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1153-54. In *Hustler*, the Ninth Circuit considered “whether the work is  
3 imaginative and original, or whether it represented a substantial investment of time and labor made in  
4 anticipation of financial return.” *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1154. Because the audio excerpts come  
5 from a call-in radio talk show, the original work at issue appears to be more informational than creative.  
6 It is reasonable to believe that plaintiff did not anticipate a future sale of, or future market for, the  
7 content arising from his comments made on a call-in show. Further, it would be difficult to reasonably  
8 construe plaintiff’s on-air comments regarding Muslims, Islam, and CAIR as fiction or fantasy, which  
9 copyright law distinguishes from factual works. *Harper & Row Publishers*, 471 U.S. at 563 (“The law  
10 generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”).  
11 However, at this stage of the litigation, the Court must assume the truth of plaintiff’s allegation that his  
12 work is a creative performance. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor weighs slightly in plaintiff’s  
13 favor.

14 **C. The amount and substantiality of the portion used**

15 Defendants argue that the amount and substantiality factor favors the fair use defense because,  
16 as plaintiff alleges, defendants used a portion “in excess of four minutes” of the two hour radio talk  
17 show. However, plaintiff argues that “the relationship of the material used by defendants to the totality  
18 of the performance cannot be decided on the pleadings” because the copied portion of the two- hour  
19 show constitutes a distinct work like a separate song on a CD and, therefore, there is a fact issue as to  
20 whether the amount copied in relation to the whole is unreasonable. Plaintiff’s Opposition at 8.

21 This factor evaluates “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the  
22 copyright as a whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). This factor looks to the quantity and significance of the  
23 material used to determine whether the use is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the  
24 defendant’s work and whether it supersedes or constitutes the heart of the original work. *Campbell*, 510  
U.S. at 586-87. In addition, the Supreme Court has considered the persuasiveness of the critic’s  
justification for the copying based on the first fair use factor, because the Court recognizes that the

1 extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use. *Id.* Even substantial  
2 quotations may constitute fair use in commenting on a published work. *Harper & Row Publishers*, 471  
3 U.S. at 564. For example, “an individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory  
4 information about himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable  
5 comment.” *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1153 (held as fair use defendants’ copying of the entire  
6 parody to rebut the parody’s derogatory message about a defendant because the use was necessary to  
provide understandable comment).

7 Plaintiff argues that the amount and substantiality of the audio excerpt constitutes the heart of  
8 the original work because it is substantial in relation to incremental segments of the program, which by  
9 themselves should constitute separate original works. It should first be noted that this claim is  
10 inconsistent with various allegations in the complaint, such as the assertion that CAIR’s “repackaging  
11 damaged the work and damaged the public image of the work because it was taken out of context . . .  
12 of ‘The Savage Nation’ . . . ,” SAC at ¶ 31, and that defendants did not use the excerpt in “the context  
13 of the statement and it is not consistent with the content of the programming as a whole,” *id.* at ¶ 32.  
14 In any event, however, defendants persuasively argue that plaintiff is barred from asserting that the  
15 audio excerpts should be compared to incremental portions as opposed to the entire two-hour show  
16 because plaintiff had registered the October 29, 2007 episode as a whole work. Defendants’ Reply at  
17 6 n.6 (citing *Melville and Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright* § 13.05[A][3]); *see* Copyright Registration  
18 Number SR0000610214. For these reasons, plaintiff’s admission that the excerpt is roughly four  
minutes out of a two hour show strongly suggests that the amount used was small in relation to the entire  
talk show program on October 29, 2007.

19 Further, even assuming as true plaintiff’s allegation that incremental portions or segments of the  
20 show constitute separate copyrightable works, and accepting plaintiff’s argument that the audio excerpts  
21 used should be compared to these portions in analyzing the amount and substantiality factor, plaintiff’s  
22 contention that this factor should weigh in his favor fails as a matter of law. As discussed in the Court’s  
23 analysis of the first fair use factor, defendants used the audio excerpts to comment on and rebut  
derogatory statements regarding their organization and their religious affiliations, and the amount used

1 in reference to plaintiff's statements was reasonably necessary to convey the extent of plaintiff's  
2 comments. As a result, regardless of whether the entire October 29, 2007 program or segments of that  
3 program constitute the entire original work for analysis under this factor, the extent of defendants'  
4 copying of the audio excerpts falls within the fair use doctrine. *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1153.  
5 Therefore, the Court finds that the amount and substantiality of material used in comparison to the  
6 original work favors the application of fair use under the third factor.

7 **D. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work**

8 The fourth factor considers "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the  
9 copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). Evaluation of this factor considers both the extent of the  
10 market harm caused by the alleged infringer's conduct and the adverse impact on the potential market  
11 for the original if this conduct were unrestricted. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 590; *Harper & Row*  
12 *Publishers*, 471 U.S. at 568. The Ninth Circuit has provided that "in determining whether the use has  
13 harmed the work's value or market, the courts have focused on whether the infringing use: (1) tends to  
14 diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the work; or (2) tends to interfere with the marketability of  
15 the work; or (3) fulfills the demand for the original work." *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1155-56  
16 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that critique or  
17 commentary of the original work, such as a parody, that kills demand for the original by force of its  
18 criticism, rather than by supplying the demands of the market, does not create a cognizable harm under  
19 the Copyright Act. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 591-92. The role of the courts is to distinguish between  
20 criticism that decreases demand and copyright infringement that essentially eliminates it by market  
21 substitution. *Id.* at 592. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has noted that "[a] use that has no effect upon  
22 the market for, and value of, the work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive  
23 to create." *Hustler Magazine*, 796 F.2d at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in  
24 original). Therefore, the scope of fair use includes "copying by others which does not materially impair  
the marketability of the work which is copied." *Id.* This last factor is the most important factor of the  
fair use defense. *Id.*

1 Defendants argue that their usage did not damage the market value of the original work. The  
2 complaint merely asserts, without more, that defendants' usage "damaged the work and damaged the  
3 public image of the work." SAC at ¶ 31. However, plaintiff fails to allege or suggest an impact on the  
4 actual or potential sale, marketability, or demand for the original, copyrighted work. There is no  
5 suggestion that plaintiff currently has, or ever had, any kind of market for the copyrighted work at issue  
6 outside its airing on the October 29, 2007 radio show. Further, he does not allege any attempts or plans  
7 to sell or license the material or derivatives thereof.<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff instead alleges that defendants caused him  
8 financial loss in advertising revenue. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it relates only to the  
9 economic impact on future shows, and has no impact on the market for the original, copyrighted show  
10 on October 29, 2007. Because this factor limits the evaluation of market impact to the *original* work  
11 at issue, not other works by the creator, the loss of advertising revenue for future shows, unrelated to  
12 the original work, does not give rise to a legal cognizable infringement claim. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at  
13 590. Allegations of this sort have been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. *Id.* at 591-92.

12 Plaintiff alleges that defendants "destroyed [the] value of the copyright material and performance  
13 as a whole, *to the extent that people gave credence to the CAIR repackaging of the content.*" SAC at  
14 ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiff admits that the effect of defendants' usage is limited to the public  
15 criticism and condemnation of the ideas within the original work, not market damage in the economic  
16 sense. For example, the posting and criticizing of the audio segment on defendants' website does not  
17 promote fundraising to the detriment of plaintiff's potential revenue on the original work. The audience  
18 that might donate and listen to the audio segment on defendants' website is separate from the audience  
19 that plaintiff possibly could stand to profit from in using his website to sell the audio content at issue.  
20 Likewise, plaintiff's allegation that defendants repackaged the original, misportraying its meaning and  
21 message, creates a presumption that the work is transformative. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579, 591-92  
(reasoning that a new work that has a different purpose, meaning, or message than the original work is

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22 <sup>2</sup> Any potential claims on the market impact of derivative works are barred as a matter of law  
23 because "there is no protectible derivative market for criticism" and impairing such a market by the  
24 effectiveness of critical commentary is not relevant under copyright law. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 592-93.

1 transformative). Because the use of the audio excerpts serves a different function, it cannot supercede  
2 the original as a market substitute. *See id.* at 591-92. As a result, the sum of plaintiff's allegations and  
3 evidence demonstrate that there will be no actual or potential market impact on the original work, and  
4 the Court finds the fourth factor strongly favors defendants.

5 **E. Conclusion re: copyright claims**

6 Assuming all of plaintiff's allegations are true, the Court finds that the majority of the four fair  
7 use factors, including the most important factors, weigh in favor of defendants. Accordingly, the Court  
8 finds that fair use applies, and GRANTS defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to  
9 plaintiff's copyright infringement claims as a matter of law. Because the Court finds that the defects  
10 of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint will not be cured by amendment, plaintiff's copyright claim  
11 is dismissed without leave to amend.

12 **II. Civil RICO Claim**

13 Defendants also assert that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for civil RICO. Plaintiff has made  
14 essentially these allegations: (1) defendants have received and made donations to terrorist affiliated  
15 groups and foreign parties; (2) defendants have had founders and officers who have been affiliated, or  
16 held positions, within groups alleged to be related to the Hamas terrorist group; (3) defendants have a  
17 goal of furthering a common agenda through the conduct of providing material support to terrorist  
18 groups by filing lawsuits and creating propaganda to discourage those who oppose their goals, by  
19 soliciting donations to certain terrorist-affiliated organizations, and by using the alleged copyright  
20 infringement to support these efforts; and (4) through this conduct, defendants have participated in a  
21 terrorist enterprise and conspiracy.

22 Defendants urge (and plaintiff rejects) four independent reasons why the Court should grant  
23 judgment on the pleadings: (1) plaintiff has no standing because he has not alleged an injury resulting  
24 from defendant's conduct; (2) plaintiff has failed to identify the RICO statutes upon which he relies and  
has failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c) for

1 racketeering claims predicated on fraud; (3) plaintiff has failed to allege an association-in-fact enterprise  
2 with the necessary shared purpose; and (4) even if plaintiff could show some injury as a result of  
3 defendant's alleged conduct, plaintiff has not pled that defendant's conduct proximately caused any  
4 injuries to plaintiff. Defendants also argue that plaintiff's entire complaint should be dismissed pursuant  
5 to the First Amendment.

6 To state a civil RICO claim, plaintiff must allege "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through  
7 a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) causing injury to plaintiff's 'business or property.'" *Ove v.*  
8 *Gwinn*, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).

9 **A. First Amendment defenses**

10 As an initial matter, plaintiff's RICO claim raises serious First Amendment concerns. Nearly  
11 all – and quite possibly all – of defendants' activities that trouble plaintiff and serve as the basis for  
12 defendants' alleged involvement in a RICO conspiracy are related to speech and thus may have First  
13 Amendment protection. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have engaged in the filing of lawsuits, the  
14 writing of letters, the organizing of boycotts, and the criticism of plaintiff himself on their website. SAC  
15 at ¶¶ 44-55. Putting aside the terrorist activities of other organizations not before the Court, the  
16 gravamen of plaintiff's dispute is with the ideas that defendants may or may not espouse. As plaintiff  
17 should no doubt be aware, this is fertile First Amendment territory, all the more so because the only one  
18 of defendants' actions that connects plaintiff in any way to the alleged RICO conspiracy – and thus  
19 potentially gives him standing to bring a RICO claim – is defendants' use of a four-minute audio clip  
20 of plaintiff's radio program on their website.

21 The First Amendment bears heavily on plaintiff's RICO allegations in two ways. First, the First  
22 Amendment bestows broad immunity on defendants for their liability arising from the filing of lawsuits  
23 or other petitions to the government. "The Supreme Court has long recognized that for the Petition  
24 Clause [of the First Amendment] to be a meaningful protection of the democratic process, citizens must  
be immune from some forms of liability for their efforts to persuade government officials to adopt policy  
or perform their functions in a certain way." *Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs.*, 146 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.

1 1998). This doctrine is referred to as the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine, which has its origins in the  
2 Supreme Court’s decision that a party could be immune from liability under the Sherman Act for efforts  
3 to influence the legislative or executive branches of government. *See E. R.R. Presidents Conference*  
4 *v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *United Mine Workers v. Pennington*, 381 U.S. 657  
5 (1965). More recently, the Supreme Court expanded the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine to protect  
6 petitioning activities before the judicial branch of government, holding that “[t]he right of access to the  
7 courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” *Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*,  
8 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). “We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of  
9 petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the  
10 channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of  
11 view . . . .” *Id.* at 510-11. Moreover, the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine has been applied to other federal  
12 laws beyond those involving antitrust violations, including the RICO Act. *Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 437  
13 F.3d 923, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine to a civil RICO claim and  
14 explaining that “[r]ecognizing the constitutional foundation of the doctrine, the Supreme Court has  
15 applied *Noerr-Pennington* principles outside the antitrust field”); *Marina Point Dev. Assocs. v. United*  
16 *States*, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (applying doctrine to civil RICO claim).

17 In short, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have made clear that the First Amendment  
18 may be used as a shield to protect those engaged in “petitioning” in the form of civil lawsuits and pre-  
19 litigation demand letters. *See DIRECTV*, 437 F.3d at 939. Here, much of plaintiff’s RICO claim is  
20 based on defendants’ involvement in the filing of lawsuits or the threat of lawsuits. SAC at ¶¶ 47, 50-  
21 52, 54. To the extent the actions complained of involve defendants’ filing of lawsuits and amicus briefs,  
22 the Court finds that defendants are entitled to *Noerr-Pennington* protection. The Court further finds that  
23 plaintiff’s complaint makes no suggestion that these lawsuits would fall under the “sham exception” to  
24 the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine because there is no suggestion that defendants did not have genuine  
desire to seek judicial relief. *Or. Natural Resources Council v. Mohla*, 944 F.2d at 531, 534-35 (9th Cir.  
1991) (explaining the application of the sham exception to the filing of lawsuits). Accordingly,  
plaintiff’s RICO claim may not be sustained on the basis of lawsuits and pre-litigation demand letters.

1 See *DIRECTV*, 437 F.3d at 942 (“[W]e hold that RICO and the predicate statutes at issue here do not  
2 permit the maintenance of a lawsuit for the sending of a prelitigation demand to settle legal claims that  
3 do not amount to a sham.”); *Marina Point Dev.*, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (Defendant’s “motion to  
4 dismiss the [civil RICO] action with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6) is  
5 granted because she is immune from liability under the First Amendment’s *Noerr-Pennington*  
6 doctrine.”).

7 Plaintiff’s claimed injury also implicates the First Amendment. The only action by defendants  
8 which plaintiff contends confers standing on him to bring his RICO claim is defendants’ decision to post  
9 a four-minute audio clip of plaintiff on their website in the context of criticizing plaintiff’s views.  
10 Although the Supreme Court has not extended the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine to speech-related  
11 activities other than petitioning, the doctrine demonstrates that defendants may use the First Amendment  
12 as a shield to defend against claims alleging antitrust and civil RICO violations, in addition to the usual  
13 cases involving state law claims for libel, defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, and the like. See,  
14 e.g., *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Indeed, Justices Souter and Kennedy have  
15 warned of the danger presented by “harassing RICO suits” and the importance of the First Amendment  
16 in preventing such harassment. *Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler*, 510 U.S. 249, 264 (1994)  
17 (Souter, J., concurring). Those justices stated that it is “prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter  
18 protected advocacy and to caution courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests  
19 that could be at stake.” *Id.* at 265. Justices Souter and Kennedy also explained that

20 legitimate free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as  
21 they arise. Accordingly, it is important to stress that nothing in the Court’s opinion  
22 precludes a RICO defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a  
23 particular case. Conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion, for example, or one  
24 of the other, somewhat elastic RICO predicate acts may turn out to be fully protected  
First Amendment activity, entitling the defendant to dismissal on that basis.

*Id.* at 264. Other courts have agreed that there would be “grave concerns were . . . defendants held liable  
under civil RICO for engaging in the expression of dissenting political opinions in a manner protected  
under the First Amendment.” *Ne. Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle*, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir.  
1989) (finding that forcible entry into abortion clinic and destruction of medical equipment “establishes  
that the jury found that Defendants’ actions went beyond mere dissent and publication of their political



1 views”).

2 Plaintiff’s complaint appears to raise precisely the First Amendment problems in the RICO  
3 context recognized by Justices Souter and Kennedy and the Third Circuit. Even assuming the truth of  
4 plaintiff’s alarming allegations that defendants are engaged in a worldwide RICO conspiracy with  
5 terrorist organizations, plaintiff’s only connection to this conspiracy, for purposes of Article III standing,  
6 is the injury he allegedly received when defendants made available a portion of his radio show on their  
7 website and criticized his views, thus causing plaintiff’s advertising revenue to decrease when some of  
8 his advertisers decided they could no longer support his show. Plaintiff’s injury is entirely founded  
9 upon defendants’ speech-related activities. It appears beyond dispute that plaintiff is a public figure and  
10 that plaintiff was discussing matters of public concern when he discussed the role of Islam in the United  
11 States and whether those of Islamic faith should be permitted to emigrate here. *See Philadelphia*  
12 *Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps*, 475 U.S. 767, 772-75 (1986) (discussing *New York Times* and other First  
13 Amendment cases). Thus, for defendants’ speech to amount to “injury” against plaintiff, for purposes  
14 of RICO and Article III standing, plaintiff would have to show with “convincing clarity,” *New York*  
15 *Times*, 276 U.S. at 285-86, that defendants’ allegedly injurious false statement or portrayal of plaintiff’s  
16 own speech was done “with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless  
17 disregard of whether it was false or not,” *id.* at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also*  
18 *Philadelphia Newspapers*, 475 U.S. at 773. This plaintiff has not even attempted to do or allege.

17 **B. Standing and proximate cause**

18 As discussed above, plaintiff’s standing depends entirely on actions taken by defendants that  
19 may be entitled to First Amendment protection. In addition to this First Amendment problem, plaintiff  
20 has not alleged a required cognizable injury or proximate cause. Plaintiff’s only allegation of injury to  
21 his business and/or property interests is that defendants inflicted damage to the value of the copyright  
22 through “the misportrayal of the meaning of the performance.” Plaintiff’s Opposition at 16-17; *see also*  
23 SAC ¶ 37. Plaintiff fails to raise any other arguments or allegations that would confer standing through  
24 a cognizable injury. *See* Plaintiff’s Opposition at 16-17.

1           There are both constitutional and prudential dimensions to the standing question. The  
2 constitutional prerequisites to standing are (1) an injury in fact which is concrete and not conjectural;  
3 (2) a causal connection between the injury and defendant's conduct or omissions; and (3) a likelihood  
4 that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555,  
5 560 (1992). The prudential limitations require (1) that the plaintiff's claim must fall within the zone of  
6 interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question; (2) that the  
7 claim must be for injury to the plaintiff's own legal rights and interests, rather than the legal rights and  
8 interests of third parties; and (3) that the injury be individualized or confined to a discrete group as  
9 opposed to a generalized grievance. *Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of*  
*Church and State*, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).

10           In order for a plaintiff to have standing to sue under civil RICO, there must be a showing (1) that  
11 the plaintiff was injured and (2) that the defendant's conduct that constitutes a RICO violation must be  
12 the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury at issue. *Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp.*, 503  
13 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992). To show an injury under RICO, a plaintiff must show a concrete financial loss  
14 and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest. *Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass'n*, 965  
15 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992); *Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites*, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).  
16 The Supreme Court has stated that there must be "some direct relation between the injury asserted and  
17 the injurious conduct alleged. Thus, a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the  
18 misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's acts was generally said to stand at too remote  
19 a distance to recover." *Holmes*, 503 U.S. at 268-69; *see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.*, 547 U.S.  
20 451, 461 (2006) ("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question  
21 it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries.")

22           The only connection between plaintiff and the RICO conspiracy he alleges is that plaintiff's  
23 copyright interests were injured when defendants "repackaged and damaged" his work.<sup>3</sup> As determined  
24

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<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff asserts the following RICO predicate acts: (1) conspiracy to commit murder; (2) conspiracy to commit arson; (3) fraud with identification documents; (4) mail fraud; (5) wire fraud; (6) financial institutional fraud; (7) illegal transactions in monetary instruments; (8) money laundering; (9) defrauding the U.S. government; (10) violation of the Travel Act; (11) filing false or materially false

1 above, however, defendants' usage of an audio segment of plaintiff's work is protected under the fair  
2 use doctrine as a matter of law. As a result, since the Court finds no copyright infringement, plaintiff  
3 has not properly asserted that he has suffered an injury to his business or property related to any of  
4 defendants' activities. *Anza*, 547 U.S. at 457. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks standing  
5 to bring his civil RICO claim and has failed to allege proximate cause. Failure to meet these required  
6 elements is fatal to plaintiff's civil RICO claim.

7 **C. Pleading requirements for racketeering claims**

8 Defendants also argue that plaintiff's pleading is deficient for a number of reasons. The Court  
9 agrees. As to all alleged predicate acts that sound in fraud, particularly regarding defendants'  
10 solicitations of donations on their website to other organizations, plaintiff fails to meet the heightened  
11 pleading requirements in specifically alleging the time and place of the misrepresentation, manner of  
12 misrepresentation, and parties to the misrepresentation. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); *Schreiber Distrib. Co.*  
13 *v. Serv-Well Furniture Co.*, 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff "must state the time, place,  
14 and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the  
15 misrepresentation") (internal quotation marks omitted).

16 In addition, the Court finds that plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is similar to the  
17 complaint at issue in *Pelletier v. Zweifel*, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1991), in which the  
18 Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a RICO claim because it was brought to harass  
19 the defendant and constituted "shotgun" pleadings that made it extremely difficult for the court and  
20 opposing parties to identify the facts that would give rise to a cognizable claim, *id.* at 1518 (noting that  
21 defendant and "the district court had to sift through the facts presented and decide for themselves which  
22 were material to the particular cause of action asserted, a difficult and laborious task indeed"). Plaintiff  
23 alleges that defendants are part of a criminal terrorist conspiracy, but makes only conclusory allegations

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
tax returns; (12) engaging in corrupt endeavor to impede and impair the due administration of the  
internal revenue laws; (13) providing material support of terrorism; and (14) criminal infringement of  
copyright.

1 lacking factual support. He sets forth a redundant narrative of allegations and conclusions of law, but  
2 makes no attempt to allege what facts are material to his claims under the RICO statute, or which facts  
3 are used to support what claims under particular subsections of RICO. For these reasons, the Court  
4 finds that plaintiff's complaint fails to meet the Rule 9 particularity requirement for averments of fraud,  
5 and also fails to meet the Rule 8 requirement of a short and plain statement that puts forth the grounds  
6 for relief and provides defendants with notice of the claims against them. These defects require  
7 dismissal of plaintiff's RICO claim.

8 **D. Association-in-fact enterprise**

9 Defendant challenges plaintiff's "enterprise" allegations. Plaintiff alleges that defendants are  
10 part of a conspiracy that operates by "dividing into cells with each cell helping the other but each cell  
11 maintaining a separate identity." Plaintiff's Opposition at 20.

12 An enterprise is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal  
13 entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.  
14 § 1961(4). The Supreme Court has identified a RICO enterprise as "a group of persons associated  
15 together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." *United States v. Turkette*, 452 U.S.  
16 576, 583 (1981). The Ninth Circuit recently held that to meet the "enterprise" element of a RICO claim,  
17 a plaintiff must allege facts that will demonstrate (1) that defendant has "associated for a common  
18 purpose of engaging in a course of conduct"; (2) that there is an "ongoing organization either formal or  
19 informal" which "is a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes"; and (3) "that the  
20 various units function as a continuing unit," meaning that the "associates' behavior was ongoing rather  
21 than isolated activity." *Odom v. Microsoft Corp.*, 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th. Cir. 2007) (en banc).

22 For the purposes of this motion, the Court must accept plaintiff's allegations as true, and  
23 therefore finds that plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to meet the "enterprise" element.

24 **E. Conclusion re: RICO claims**

The Court GRANTS defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's RICO

1 claim because plaintiff lacks Article III standing, has not pled proximate cause, and has filed a complaint  
2 that does not comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court  
3 will grant plaintiff leave to amend the RICO portion of his complaint.

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 The Court GRANTS defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings [Docket No. 12].  
6 Plaintiff's copyright claim is dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff must amend his civil RICO  
7 claim, should he wish to do so, by **August 15, 2008**. If plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Court  
8 will reschedule a case management conference as needed.

9 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

10  
11 Dated: July 25, 2008

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14 SUSAN ILLSTON  
15 United States District Judge  
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