SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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IN RE:)	CASE NUMBER: BP 168725
ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVE OF SUMNER M.)))	TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION
REDSTONE))))	Date: May 9, 2016 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: 79

At the above-referenced date and time, the renewed motion of Sumner M. Redstone ("Redstone") to dismiss this case, pursuant to Probate Code sec. 4768, came on for hearing, during the trial, before the undersigned. Hueston Hennigan, by Robert N. Klieger, as well as Loeb & Loeb, by Gabrielle A. Vidal, appeared on behalf of Redstone. Greenberg, Glusker, et al., by Pierce O'Donnell, appeared on behalf of Manuela Herzer.

The Court has considered the evidence discussed below, as well as the matters previously made part of the file of this case, reviewed the motion and response to the motion, both received May 8, 2016, and heard oral argument of counsel.

INTRODUCTION

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Towards the end of the first day of trial on May 6, 2016, after hearing two of Herzer's witnesses, Redstone and Dr. Read, Redstone brought this motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that the petition was no longer necessary in light of the testimony. As discussed below, this testimony does in fact completely alter this case.

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STATEMENT OF KEY TESTIMONY

Redstone, almost ninety three years of age, from whom the Court had not previously heard in any manner, testified at trial, by way of a video transcript of his deposition, pursuant to an order filed May 2, 2016, essentially as follows:

- "Manuela is a fucking bitch." (He made this statement several times.)
- She used to live with him for a year and he kicked her out in 2015. She helped him with his health care.
- Herzer had stolen money from him.
- He removed her from his home because "she lied to me."
- She lied "about Terry's availability and Sydney's letter."
- He tried to use the board of letters in front of him (which was not easy for him in view of his difficulty in moving his arm) to spell out "LIE."
- He had fallen in love with Manuela but did not still love her.
- He has been seeing his family lately and is satisfied with the nursing care he is receiving.

- "I hate her. I want Manuela out of my life."
- He does not want Manuela to make health care decisions for him.
- He wants "Shar...Shari" to make his health care decisions for him if he is unable to do so himself.

Dr. Stephen Read testified to the following key point:

- It would be "very difficult" for Herzer to now act as Redstone's agent. If a relationship between a principal and agent is severed, and the principal does not trust the agent, it would be rational for the person not to use that person as agent. The principal should have some trust in the agent.

APPLICABLE LAW

Probate Code sec. 4650 states in relevant part: "The Legislature finds the following: (a) In recognition of the dignity and privacy a person has a right to expect, the law recognizes that an adult has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to his or her own health care..."

Probate Code sec. 4657 states in relevant part: "A patient is presumed to have the capacity to give or revoke an advance health care directive, and to designate or disqualify a surrogate...."

Probate Code sec. 4750(a) states: "An advance health care directive is effective and exercisable free of judicial intervention."

Probate Code sec. 4697(a) states: "If after executing a power of attorney for health care the principal's marriage to the agent is dissolved or annulled, the principal's designation of the former spouse as an agent to make health care decisions for the principal is revoked."

Probate Code sec. 4768 states in relevant part: "The court may dismiss a petition if it appears that the proceeding is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the patient..."

DISCUSSION

1. THE PRIOR DISMISSAL MOTION

Initially, the Court is in a considerably different position now than when it heard this motion on February 29, 2016: First, the Court did not grant that motion before where there were disputed material facts requiring an evidentiary hearing. Now, by contrast, the Court is holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court has heard from the two key witnesses whom Herzer herself wanted the Court to hear from – Redstone and her expert, Dr. Read. Second, as the Court stated at the hearing on the earlier motion to dismiss, it had no testimony from Redstone. For this reason, at that time, the Court anticipated the trial would likely focus on the competing expert opinions. The Court has now, however, heard from Redstone – who has stated in very firm terms what he wants. Without that testimony previously, the Court was not in a position to make a factual determination concerning the conflicting accounts as to his capacity.

For these reasons, the Court denied the motion, without prejudice, and specifically noted it might be brought again at trial. Therefore, though at the hearing counsel asked the Court to "reconsider" its decision not to dismiss this petition, the Court treats the request as a renewed motion. Accordingly, the Court's prior decision does not now bar it from deciding the motion as now framed.

2. RELEVANCE OF TRIAL TESTIMONY

The Court has heard from the one key witness Herzer herself insisted from the outset of this case that the Court hear from: Redstone. Redstone had not otherwise intended to appear at trial in view of the medical risks and difficulties involved in doing so. However, Redstone's testimony has ultimately defeated her case. Though Herzer may have believed that Redstone would not be able to say anything, or be able to understand the questions, Redstone did both:

In brief but compelling testimony, Redstone overcame his very significant physical ailments, including inability to speak clearly and what looked like much pain in swallowing, to do his best to recount what is set forth above. Though indisputably the Court relied on the interpreter to understand what Redstone said, the Court could still see him enunciating words that seemed consistent with what the interpreter stated.² The Court was able to see the strong

²⁴ See February 29, 2016 ruling, p. 6, fn. 5. As also then stated, one advantage of bringing a motion at trial is that it allows the Court to weigh the credibility of the evidence – which is not possible when just reviewing declarations before trial.

² The interpreter, Anne Lefton, was sworn in as such prior to the start of the deposition. The Court has been offered no proffer of evidence to suggest that she did not follow her oath or that she did not know how to interpret Redstone. The Court also did not notice any discrepancy, to the extent it could, between what the interpreter said and what it appeared Redstone was trying to say.

conviction he had about what he said. He seemed very alert. He was composed and did not appear angry. The Court does not believe Redstone had any confusion about what he was asked, about his wishes or the reasons for his wishes. His lawyer asked him what he wanted the judge to do and the Court heard what he wanted – for his daughter Shari Redstone ("Shari") to serve as his agent.³

As discussed below, there are no legal grounds not to follow his stated wishes.

Herzer's other witness, Dr. Read, and her only expert, did not testify to anything which would change the Court's analysis. Dr. Read's report of February 4, 2016 was that Redstone's level of comprehension was just "somewhat impaired." He agreed with Drs. Spar and Gold — who also believe Redstone has not lost his ability to comprehend matters. Specifically, Dr. Read stated in his report on this issue: "Redstone seemed essentially to be able to understand my questions such that many responses were meaningful." Significantly, Dr. Read also stated at trial that Redstone remembered all of the names of his children, grandchildren and great grandchildren. Dr. Read also stated though that even if Redstone understood the questions at his deposition, or understood what he did on October 16, he did not have an understanding of their consequences.

However, Redstone made crystal clear at his deposition that the reason he did not want

Herzer as his agent was that he had kicked her out of his home. He did not trust her because he
believed she had lied to him and stolen money from him. He also recalled what she had lied to
him about. The Court can think of no more rational reason to change one's agent. Further,

Redstone understood what the significance would be of his having kicked her out where he knew

³ For ease of reference, and without intending any disrespect, the Court will use Ms. Redstone's first name herein to differentiate her from her father.

that she had been helping him with medical issues and that she would no longer be his health care agent. Similarly, Dr. Read testified Redstone understood the risks with his medical conditions, including his feeding tube, and that he would need a health care agent to make decisions for him if he were incapacitated.

Redstone had also not forgotten what Herzer meant to him: he remembered that he had loved her and she had been living with him. Though Herzer states she and Redstone have known each other for some seventeen years, as Redstone noted, they have only lived together for a year or so. Redstone's testimony, though strong (and apparently this is consistent with how he has always been), it was not out of control anger that overshadowed his other thoughts – as Dr. Read indicated might happen. Likewise, if as Herzer argues he was just brainwashed by Shari or those allegedly working with her, he would not have acknowledged his vulnerability by admitting that he had fallen in love with Herzer when shown a photograph of them together he remembered was at the Paramount lot.

Herzer argues that the Court should not take what Redstone stated at face value in the same way just because a person says in a will what he or she wants that this would not be dispositive of lack of capacity or undue influence in such context. However, seeing Redstone speak was a far different experience than when a court, after a person, passes reviews what that person stated in a will – where that court then would have no insight from the document as to what the person intended from the testator himself.

Finally, Herzer argues that because Redstone appeared to answer questions of his counsel more easily than some of those of Herzer's counsel, Redstone was coached. However, Redstone did answer the questions of Herzer's counsel – about which he could not have been coached.

Moreover, it is not uncommon, and advisable, for a witness to think about a question from an

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attorney for an opposing side before answering. That Redstone did what most people would do cannot be fairly used against him. Furthermore, Redstone likely knew his own attorney, as opposed to Herzer's lawyer, and hence would have been more comfortable answering her questions.

3. LEVEL OF REQUIRED CAPACITY

The issue to be decided that Redstone needed to have the ability to understand its nature and consequences, under Probate Code sec. 4609 (and Probate Code sec. 812 by reference), is solely as to which agent he wanted; not a decision as to what care he needed. (The decision about his care would be something that his physician or the nursing staff would assist him with.)

However, the law is unclear what level of capacity is required for this purpose.

Herzer argues that a high level of contractual level of capacity is required to change an agent on an advanced health care directive. Redstone argues, by contrast, that the correct level would be the capacity to make a decision to marry or divorce – which is at the lowest level of capacity on the sliding scale of capacity relating to the act in question, citing to *Marriage of Greenway* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628. (See also *Anderson v. Hunt* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722) In *Greenway*, the Court does not hold that changing an advanced health care directive requires contractual capacity and merely states in *dicta* that the power to contract includes powers of attorney. *Id.*, 217 Cal.App.4th at 642.

Where the Court is not now making a finding as to capacity, however, the Court does not need to decide this question.

Solely for purposes of deciding whether it is reasonably necessary to continue with this proceeding, the analogy to marrying or divorce, at the lowest level of capacity, makes sense where similarly the issue here boils down to one of trusting another person (and not of any legal obligations between Redstone and Herzer). Whatever the reasons may be for loss of trust, even if those reasons are wrong, the underlying issue for Redstone, as set forth above, is that he does not now trust Herzer. While Redstone acknowledged that he had loved Herzer, he no longer did so. In the same way when people have "irreconcilable differences" and separate, the issue is not who is right or wrong but that one person chooses to no longer live with the other person. For this reason, courts do not now attempt to determine who, if anyone, is "at fault" in a dissolution of marriage. The same rationale is applicable here. Whether Redstone ultimately was wrong about what Herzer did or did not do no longer matters. The issue is he has lost his trust in her.

(See also Greenway, supra, "it is well settled the decision to end a marriage is irretrievably broken does not need to be based on objective facts." Id., 217 Cal.App.4th at 651)

Given this predicament, Dr. Read had to rightfully acknowledge that Herzer could not now serve as Redstone's agent.

4. ANY NEED TO HEAR THE REST OF THE EVIDENCE

This Court sees no overriding reason to put Redstone – who is the only person that this case is ultimately concerned about (or family members) - through the significant time and

⁴ In this regard, it should be noted that for purposes of testamentary capacity, at a higher level of capacity than marital capacity, "old age, feebleness, forgetfulness...failure to recognize old friends or relatives, physical disability, absent-mindedness and mental confusion do not furnish grounds for holding that a testator lacked testamentary capacity." *Greenway*, *supra*, 217 Cal.App.4th at 642

expense, at high emotional cost, particularly at this precarious stage in his life, as well as cause undue infringement on his private and personal matters, where this proceeding would not make any difference for purposes of the very limited issue at stake in this case as to who he has named as his health care agent. Such evidence would not make a difference, again, not just because of Redstone's testimony, as Herzer argues the Court would be relying upon, but also based upon the testimony of her expert that Herzer could not serve as his agent at this point.

Moreover, to require the parties to address whether Redstone was or was not under a delusion about various matters – which is the primary reason Dr. Read has to differentiate his opinion from that of Dr. Spar - is inconsistent with Probate Code sec. 4697(a): If an agent is the spouse of the patient, and those persons divorce, and the directive is thereby automatically revoked, the Court does not see any reason why a patient who has *no* legal duties to his agent should have to go through a far more complicated process than persons who do have legal duties to one another. There is no dispute, after all, that Redstone had a right to remove Herzer from his house on October 12, 2015.

Under these circumstances, where Herzer has no other expert testimony to offer, the Court does not see any reason it needs to hear any further evidence. There is nothing more that Herzer could put on that would be "reasonably necessary for the interest of the patient" for purposes of Probate Code sec. 4768.

⁵ Importantly, the issue on this petition is not Redstone's medical care – about which there is no controversy he is receiving the same top quality attention he received when Herzer was living with Redstone – or even who would be the *best* agent (as Herzer asserts) – only did Redstone understand what he was doing in changing his agent or if he was unduly influenced to do so. Similarly, this Court is definitely not the party which decides whether a directive is activated – as the response to this motion contends. Under all circumstances, this would be for Dr. Gold to decide.

Herzer has had "her day in court" even if coincidentally here that coincided with one day – including testimony of Redstone that this Court ultimately believed it needed to order, on her insistence, given his centrality to the issues to be decided at trial.

5. THE SPECIFIC RULING THE COURT IS MAKING

In now granting this motion, the Court is *not* making any ultimate finding related to Redstone's mental capacity, one way or another, or whether he was unduly influenced in revoking the September directive.⁶ Similarly, the Court is not making any judgment calls about Herzer or Shari's credibility or motives at this time where the Court has not heard all the evidence it would need to make such decisions.

The Court recognizes that Herzer would put on additional witnesses to attempt to prove these contentions and seek to rebut the presumption of capacity. There is no requirement, however, as there is on a motion for non-suit, for example, to wait until Herzer has finished putting on her case to decide this motion under Probate Code sec. 4768. Indeed, it would make no sense for this motion to only be able to be brought at the end of the case. If that were true, there would be no reason for the statute and the Court would just have to decide the issues. Moreover, Herzer made no argument when this motion was made before that it was premature to do so *before trial*. If the motion was not premature then it cannot be premature now. Finally, the

⁶ In order that there be no confusion, the Court is not in this case addressing Redstone's mental capacity for any purposes other than with respect to the health care directive.

⁷ Therefore, this is not an issue of the Court not keeping an open mind – as Herzer suggests. The Court is not now deciding these issues at all. Similarly, the Court purposefully did not make any ruling on May 6 on the motion to dismiss this case without first giving the parties an opportunity to address the issue and itself taking time, like a juror, to carefully consider what to decide.

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language of the statute – in stating "not reasonably necessary" - infers that the motion would be heard before the case was concluded.

The Court is finding only that the "proceeding is not reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the patient." Specifically, Herzer cannot be restored as his agent and Redstone is satisfied with the care he is receiving and to be with his family.

6. LIMITED FOCUS OF CASE AND INABILITY TO FASHION REMEDY

Herzer argues that Redstone's wish that she not now serve as his agent, and the opinion of her expert, Dr. Read, that her serving as agent would be "very difficult," should not put a stop to this case. She argues that the Court may fashion some other solution should she prove lack of capacity or undue influence. However, the nature of this proceeding is limited to the petition Herzer filed; i.e., only for an order finding the October directive invalid either for lack of capacity or because of undue influence. If Herzer had wanted the Court to make an order that put someone other than her in charge of Redstone's care, or be able to have some discretion to create a solution that was in Redstone's best interests, she could have filed a petition for conservatorship of his person and sought such an order. For whatever reason, she did not do so. This Court has no power in this limited scope case to put someone other than Herzer in charge of

⁸ In a similar vein, Herzer argues that the Court needs to hear from Keryn Redstone before dismissing the case. Though the Court anticipated Herzer would call her as a witness, Keryn Redstone is not a party to this case and has no right to be heard in this case. It was precisely out of a concern for this sort of unanticipated issue that the Court denied her last minute request to intervene. Should she wish to be heard relating to her grandfather's care, she can consult with her own attorneys.

Redstone's care – in the event the Court were to have found the September directive invalid for one of the claimed reasons.

7. LIKELY WEAKNESS OF UNDERLYING CLAIMS

Though the Court is not determining if Redstone lacked capacity, the Court does note the following in addressing Dr. Read's concern that Redstone might not appreciate the consequences of his deposition testimony where it is also not in dispute that Redstone suffers from either mild or moderate dementia:

- Herzer did not allege that in the September 3, 2015 directive wherein Redstone named
 her as the primary agent that he then lacked capacity this was only a month before.
 There was no evidence that Redstone's mental acuity deteriorated in that month.
 Therefore, the claim of lack of capacity would likely be a hard one on which to prevail.
- 2. Dr. Read stated himself it was not irrational for Redstone to choose to elevate Phillipe

 Dauman from the alternate agent that he was under the September 3 directive to his

 primary agent in the October 16 directive replacing Herzer. It was undisputed that

 Dauman is and has been Redstone's long term trusted advisor and business colleague.
- 3. Herzer had never in fact acted as his agent pursuant to the September 3 directive. As of this date, no directive has been activated by the person designated in the directives to make the decision as to whether it should be activated his primary physician, Dr. Gold.

 (See also Probate Code sec. 4658) In turn, the medical team in place at the house was apparently installed before Herzer moved in and hence was not something for which she

 could claim all credit. Therefore, Redstone would have little reason to believe that Herzer's role in his life was so essential.

- 4. Even if Redstone and Shari have had disagreements about money or business over the years, as have many families, and even if they were estranged for periods for whatever reason, it is without controversy that the bond of love between a parent and child is a hard one to break completely. Particularly when vulnerable, as it is agreed Redstone now is, it is natural that he would reach out to his daughter, particularly in the absence of a spouse, as someone he could trust and for them to attempt to reconcile. Redstone states that he is happy to be with his family and Shari has stated that they have reconciled. (Subsequently, on April 4, 2016, a further directive was executed naming Shari as his primary agent.)⁹
- 5. Several of Dr. Read's critiques of Redstone's mental acuity related to matters not directly impacting his comprehension of choice of agent such as mathematical skills. Similarly, Dr. Read's expectations of Redstone seemed a bit unrealistic in terms of what could be reasonably expected of somebody who is almost ninety three. No person that age is likely going to have all the mental faculties expected of younger people.

⁹ Herzer argues that the Court cannot allow Shari to serve as Redstone's agent. However, Herzer never sought to join Shari as a party to this case and therefore where she is not a party it is unclear if the Court would have the power to prevent her taking on that duty in any event. The issue of whether she is a necessary party has never been raised. At this point, she is just a witness for purposes of whether she unduly influenced her father in executing the October, 2015 directive. The Court understands Herzer's petition to have been only amended to address the April, 2016 directive (wherein Shari is named as primary agent) inasmuch as that might be likewise invalidated if the October, 2015 directive was invalidated.

Moreover, it was already agreed that the issue concerning the time when Redstone was in the hospital in 2014, and what Shari and or Herzer did or said at that time relevant to whether Shari should serve as agent, would not be a part of the evidence to be heard even if this trial did go forward.

- 6. Dr. Read agreed that he could find little to fault in Dr. James Spar's letter stating it was his opinion that on October 16 Redstone had the capacity to and did understand the consequences of what he was doing, and that he made those decisions himself free of undue influence. Dr. Read also acknowledged that Dr. Spar was in a better position than he was to assess Redstone in view of Dr. Spar having met Redstone before and that he was present at the time the directive was revoked. Dr. Read also acknowledged that reasonable minds can differ about capacity and that he respected the expertise of his colleague, Dr. Spar.
- 7. Further, the two matters about which Dr. Spar stated in his letter dated October 23, 2015 that Redstone told him were the reasons he was signing the documents on October 16 as to Herzer namely, that Herzer lied to him about Terry Holbrook and the Holland letter—were *not* matters about which Dr. Read performed any investigation as to whether they were delusions on Redstone's part. Therefore, other than what Herzer told him, Dr. Read does not provide any reason not to believe what Redstone told Dr. Spar when the directive was revoked -- which exact testimony Redstone repeated at his deposition. Finally, as far as whether the Court still needs to hear further concerning undue influence, the parties stipulated already at trial that Redstone was "susceptible" to undue influence. Hence, the Court does not need to hear anything further on this part of the issue. As far as whether Shari, or persons at her behest, in fact unduly influenced Redstone to revoke the directive, again is

¹⁰ At trial, Herzer introduced Ex. 305 – a chart that was intended to show the reasons Dr. Read supposedly believed Redstone was deluded. However, for whatever reason, these ostensible reasons why Redstone was deluded did not include the two reasons Redstone identified for why he removed Herzer from the directive.

immaterial where there is the same overriding issue now that Redstone does not trust Herzer and that it no longer makes sense for her to serve in such capacity.

Moreover, if Shari had been able to unduly influence her father to revoke the directive, for sake of argument, presumably she would have made herself his agent. In fact, however, it is undisputed that on October 6, 2015 Redstone chose Dauman as his primary agent and another business colleague, Thomas Dooley, as the alternate agent - not Shari. It is undisputed that Redstone had not by then reconciled with Shari. Further, it is unclear how Shari would "profit" from Redstone revoking the health care directive. For these reasons, the undue influence claim makes little sense.11 The Court does not see how Herzer could prevail on this theory so as to make it necessary to keep this case going to its conclusion.

CONCLUSION

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Herzer asks this Court to exercise its powers to look after Redstone. The Probate Code makes clear, however, that medical decisions are for people themselves to make and that they should be able to do so, in private and without interference, in consultation with their physician. Ordinarily, patients should not have to go through litigation over such matters if interested persons disagree about a person's medical care. Advanced health care directives are intended to

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¹¹ The Court does not find that Shari was acting for improper purposes from the testimony of the nurse, Joseph Octiviano, that he and Shari apparently had an agreement that he would report to her any abuse he saw of her father in the home, notwithstanding his agreement with Redstone not to disclose what he saw to anyone and his ethical duties as a nurse. It appears Shari felt the need to go to considerable lengths to find out if Herzer or others were stealing from her father which Redstone now states was the case at least as to Herzer. Presumably, if Herzer was looking out for Redstone's best interests, she would have no reason not to allow Shari to have an easier way of finding out what was happening. As indicated above, however, the Court reaches no final conclusions on these issues.

be effective without judicial involvement. Courts are ill equipped to analyze medical issues and it is an indignity for patients to have to publicly disclose their ailments in court unless there is some good cause for it.

Here, there is no good cause for further judicial involvement where the Court has now heard directly from Redstone that he has lost trust in Herzer, does not want her in his life and instead wants his daughter Shari to look after him if necessary. Redstone is presumed to have capacity and Herzer's expert did not establish that he lacked capacity to change his agent. Redstone is free to make this decision for whatever reason, even if for a poorly thought out or erroneous reason. This Court has no business interfering with his prerogatives. Furthermore, Herzer's own witness, Dr. Read, has stated that where there is a lack of trust, it would not make sense for Herzer to serve as Redstone's agent. In addition, Redstone has stated he is satisfied with the care he is receiving and wants Shari to be his agent (who has since become his agent — apparently due to Dauman's unavailability). Therefore, this proceeding is "not reasonably necessary for protecting the interests of the patient."

For these reasons, this motion is granted. Herzer's petition is dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May __, 2016

DAVID J. COWAN Judge of the Superior Court